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Today it is prosaic to say that "feminism is dead." Far from
being moribund, feminist legal theory is breaking from its
somewhat dogmatic past and forging ahead with new vigor.
Many modern feminist legal scholars seek innovative ways to
better the legal, social, and economic status of women while
simultaneously questioning some of the more troubling moves of
second-wave feminism, such as the tendency to essentialize the
woman's experience, the turn to authoritarian state policies, and
the characterization of women as pure objects or agents. These
"neofeminists" prioritize women's issues but maintain a strong
commitment to distributive justice and recognize that
subordination exists on multiple axes. In defining "neofeminism,"
this Article examines how the troubling nature of certain second-
wave feminist principles engendered new schools of feminist
thought. It then illustrates this process in the domestic violence
law reform context. The Article concludes that recognizing a new
and vibrant progressive feminism can counter exaggerated
claims of feminism's demise, the belief that feminism has been
devastated by postmodern critique, and the appropriation of the
feminist label by conservative women's groups.
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. I would like to thank Katharine
Bartlett, Shelley Cavalieri, Cyra Choudhury, Donna Coker, Frank Rudy Cooper, Nancy
Ehrenreich, Jorge Esquirol, Leigh Goodmark, Neil Gotanda, Jennifer Hendricks, Laura
Kessler, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Peggie Smith, and Ahmed White for their helpful input.
I also thank the organizers of the Baltimore Legal Feminism Conference for devoting a
workshop to the concept of neofeminism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Feminism gets a bad rap. It comes from all sides-from
conservatives who decry the movement as nothing more than a
platform for "angry" women to "bash" men' to racial justice
scholars who criticize feminism for compounding the problems
faced by minorities.! Young women often say that although they
1. See, e.g., Dan Subotnik, "Hands Off': Sex, Feminism, Affirmative Consent, and
the Law of Foreplay, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JUST. 249, 306 (2007) (describing rape
reform as the product of "angry feminists" desiring to "put[ I a man in jail"); Erin Pizzey,
How the Women's Movement Taught Women to Hate Men, FATHERS FOR LIFE,
http://fathersforlife.org/pizzey/how...women weretaught-to-hate-men.htm (last updated
Mar. 4, 2006). There are also countless blog and internet posts describing similar
criticisms. See, e.g., Sarah Stefanson, How To: Deal with Angry Feminists, ASKMEN.COM,
httpilwww.askmen.com/dating/heidi_400/426_how-to-deal-with-angry-feminists.html
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
2. See BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 23 (1984)
(observing that because "feminism is often equated with white women's rights efforts,"
minority women "dismiss the term because they do not wish to be perceived as supporting
a racist movement"); I. Bennett Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
1345, 1367 (2010); Kimberld Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:
A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CI. LEGAL F. 139, 154 (1989); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in
Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1306-07 (2000).
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"believe in equality," they would not call themselves "feminists."
As one scholar notes:
[A] wide contingent of young women-perhaps, we are told,
most-decline to consider themselves as feminists at all.
Among these non- or even anti-feminists, the perception is
said to exist that equality for women has largely been
achieved, so that the unself-critical focus on gender equality
of feminism's earlier "waves" is jejune ... . Whether or not
the dark stripe of much of feminist thought has put them
off or has merely served to demarcate their apparent sense
of distinctness, the young women who spurn an avowedly
feminist identity seem willing to dismiss the ongoing need
for a feminist movement as toast.'
The decades of public disdain for and scholarly critique of
this movement have caused the media, academics, and students
alike to declare that feminism is dead.!
Justice-minded scholars, who centralize the experience of
women in their theorizing and policy proposals as a vehicle to
both understand larger subordination and remedy lived gender
inequity, should reaffirm the movement in the face of scholarly
discontent and popular bashing. Progressive scholars can
respond to the pervasive criticism of feminism from the left and
incessant trashing from the right by uniting in the message that
rumors of feminism's demise are greatly exaggerated. If one
accepts the contention that feminism as a social and intellectual
movement has ceased to make desirable political and academic
contributions, the winners are not liberals but the patriarchal
3. See DEBORAH SIEGEL, SISTERHOOD INTERRUPTED 9 (2007) ("[Slome younger
women flee from the feminist label... ."); Linda L. Ammons, Dealing with the Nastiness:
Mixing Feminism and Criminal Law in the Review of Cases of Battered Incarcerated
Women-A Tenth-Year Reflection, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 891, 910 (2001) ("Today some
view even the label feminist as something akin to a four-letter word."); Ann Bartow, Some
Dumb Girl Syndrome: Challenging and Subverting Destructive Stereotypes of Female
Attorneys, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 221, 224-25 (2005) (recounting the "[alttempts
to discourage women from identifying themselves as feminists").
4. Jane Maslow Cohen, Equality for Girls and Other Women: The Built
Architecture of the Purposive Life, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 103, 108-09 (1998).
5. See, e.g., Soc. GRP. AT THE CTR. FOR ADVANCED FEMINIST STUDIES, Introduction
to Is ACADEMIC FEMINISM DEAD? 3 (The Social Group at the Center for Advanced
Feminist Studies, U. Minnesota ed., 2000) ("[Fleminism is proclaimed dead with almost
comical regularity."); Susanne Baer, Dignity, Liberty, Equality: A Fundamental Rights
Triangle of Constitutionalism, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 417, 425 n.11 (2009) (noting the
"recurring talk about a 'death of feminism'"); Elisabeth Schuissler Fiorenza, Public
Discourse, Religion, and Wo/men's Struggles for Justice, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 1077, 1077
n.2 (2002) (discussing how the media continually poses the question "Is feminism dead?");
Frances Elisabeth Olsen, Feminism in Central and Eastern Europe: Risks and
Possibilities of American Engagement, 106 YALE L.J. 2215, 2246 n.159 (1997) (observing
that the claim that feminism is past its prime has been around since the 1950s).
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right. The demonizing of the term "feminism" has gone hand-in-
hand with the concerted and carefully mapped effort from the
right to stamp out all antisubordination discourse as nefarious
"PC talk."' Moreover, a sizeable portion of the U.S. population
believes that women have achieved equality or that any
inequality is due to biological or preference differences between
the sexes.' Feminist scholarship is so important during a time
when many believe the United States is post-sexist in addition to
being "post-racial."'
On the other hand, for many progressives, the left wing
critiques of feminism are valid and powerful. Feminism has often
conceived of women's issues as the interests of white, upper-
middle-class women.9 Feminism has often united with police
power in a way that disadvantages not only subordinated men
but also women who occupy the lowest socioeconomic statuses.'o
Feminism has often adopted positions that objectify women,n
6. See JOHN K. WILsoN, THE MYTH OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS: THE
CONSERVATIVE ATTACK ON HIGHER EDUCATION 2 (1995) (observing that the conservative
constructed "myth of political correctness has made every radical idea .. . seem like the
coming of an apocalypse . .. complete with four new horsepeople-Speech Codes,
Multiculturalism, Sexual Correctness, and Affirmative Action"). The Internet is bursting
with vilifying and demeaning descriptions of feminism and feminists. For example,
UrbanDictionary.com is a website that allows people to post definitions of terms. The
frightening definitions of "feminist" include "[miale-hating, PC, whiney left-wing-
extremist bitch." URBANDICTIONARY.CoM, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?
term=pc%20feminist (last visited Apr. 10, 2013); see also Bartow, supra note 3, at 224
("[F]eminists are credited with profound negative influence largely as a mechanism for
preventing them from gaining enough positive influence to affect significant social
changes.").
7. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 108-09; Marne L. Lenox, Note, Neutralizing the
Gendered Collateral Consequence of the War on Drugs, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 280, 287-88, 297
n.113 (2011) (noting the "common perception of gender equality" in the United States); see
also, e.g., Lawrence H. Summers, Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the
Science & Engineering Workforce (Jan. 14, 2005) (transcript available at
http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/summers_2005/nber.php (last visited Aug. 6,
2011)) (attributing the lack of women in science to "taste differences between little girls
and little boys").
8. Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace
Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1261 (2011). Even as talk of a post-racial America was
burgeoning during the 2008 election, a CBS News poll revealed that far more respondents
(42%) felt that racism was the bigger problem in the United States than sexism (10%) (A
full 23% felt that neither was a problem). Poll, CBS News, Race, Gender, and Politics:
March 15-18, 2008 (Mar. 19, 2008), available at http://www.ebsnews.com/htdocspdf/
RACE..ANDSEX-mar08a.pdf. Perhaps not surprisingly, those same respondents were in
fact more prejudiced against women political candidates than African-American ones. See
id.
9. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 266-275 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part III.D.
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deny sexual agency, 2 and promote a heterocentric and
essentializing view of womanhood." In response, some
progressives simply "take a break from feminism."" Race
scholars oppose feminism's tendency to ignore the experiences of
black women" and its complicity in the oppression of black men;"
class scholars dismiss feminism as furthering the interests only
of bourgeois women;" and postmodern scholars reject feminism
because of its essentialist presumptions about women's special
ontology.
Many critics of mainstream feminism continue to theorize in
gendered terms and seek to further women's interests, but they
reject aspects of feminism that have proven troubling. Influenced
by Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, Latinalo Critical
Legal Theory (LatCrit) ideas, and Marxist theory, these scholars
are principally concerned with gender inequality but wary of the
tendency of feminism to essentialize the female (and male)
experience; downplay race, class, and other subordinate statuses;
and rely on liberal rights regimes or alternatively authoritarian
criminal policies.' Indeed, this Author has critiqued feminist
12. See infra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 130-133 and accompanying text.
14. See generally, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990); JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO
TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006).
15. See Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 154 (contending that in feminist theory, "[n]ot
only are women of color in fact overlooked, but their exclusion is reinforced when white
women speak for and as women"); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 2, at 1306-07 (observing
the break between women of color and white feminists).
16. See, e.g., Capers, supra note 2, at 1367 ("[Fleminist scholars have entrenched an
approach to analyzing rape allegations that is, if not overtly racist, very much
racialized.").
17. See, e.g., CAROLINE RAMAzANOGLU, FEMINISM AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF
OPPRESSION 16 (1989) (noting that liberal feminism "has appealed to bourgeois or middle-
class women" rather than "the millions of working-class, rural, and destitute women who
make up the majority of the world's female population"); Filomena Chioma Steady, The
Black Woman Cross-Culturally: An Overview, in THE BLACK WOMAN CROSS-CULTURALLY
7, 23-24 (Filomena Chioma Steady ed., 1981) (criticizing feminism for concentrating "on
sexual symbolism rather than on more substantive economic realities"); Regina Austin &
Elizabeth Schneider, Mary Joe Frug's Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto Ten Years
Later: Reflections on the State of Feminism Today, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2001)
(Comment by Regina Austin) ("A 'feminist' theory that works to liberate one group of
women (Western, bourgeois professional women, for example) may result in the
oppression of another (poor immigrant domestic workers of color, for example).").
18. See generally BUTLER, supra note 14, at 5-9; HALLEY, supra note 14, at 57-58.
19. See, e.g., Cyra Akila Choudhury, Exporting Subjects: Globalizing Family Law
Progress Through International Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 259, 260-61, 284
(2011); Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law:
A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 851-52 (2001); Nancy E. Dowd,
Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 WIs. J.L. GENDER & Soc'Y 201, 240-41
(2008); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire,
2013] 1329
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domestic violence and rape reform for its complicity in
maintaining the authoritarian and racially biased American
penal state.2 0 Even while supporting the feminist moral hierarchy
that nonviolent relationships are better than abusive
relationships and sexual choice is preferable to coercion, one can
still question the use of police power to enforce this hierarchy.
State power, like an eager tenant, can and will quickly take up
residence in the architecture of progressive legal experiments.
Thus, it appears that the current state of woman-centric
legal scholarship evidences a "neofeminist" moment in which
progressive scholars, mindful of the complexity of subordination,
seek to further women's interests without exacerbating
subordination in other spheres. The term "neofeminism" is
symbolically important because it signifies a commitment to
women's empowerment" and appropriates an importantly
radicalized term, while also recognizing that the approach is
"new" because it incorporates intersectional antisubordination
analysis and responds to observed problems with past
* 22interventions.
101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 181-83 (2001); Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-
Essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2009); Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in
Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four
Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 411-12
(2006); Angela P. Harris, Theorizing Class, Gender, and the Law: Three Approaches, 72
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, Fall 2009, at 37, 44-45, 51; Laura T. Kessler, Getting
Class, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 915, 916-17 (2008); Prabha Kotiswaran, Labours in Vice or
Virtue? Neo-Liberalism, Sexual Commerce, and the Case of Indian Bar Dancing, 37 J.L. &
Soc'Y 105, 105, 113 (2010); Holly Maguigan, Wading into Professor Schneider's "Murky
Middle Ground" Between Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses to
Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 427, 433-34 (2003); G. Kristian
Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization
of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 281-82 (2005); Adele M.
Morrison, Changing the Domestic Violence (Dis)Course: Moving from White Victim to
Multi-Cultural Survivor, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1061, 1078-79 (2006).
20. See generally Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741
(2007) [hereinafter Gruber, Feminist War]; Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on
Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581 (2009) [hereinafter Gruber, Rape, Feminism].
21. See Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory and Law, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
349, 359 n.21 (1995) (maintaining that feminist legal theory "must be woman-centered,
gendered by its very nature").
22. When using the term "neofeminism" at conferences, I often receive comments
about the term's possible negative connotations. Many scholars who tend to agree with
the basic premises of neofeminism, described later in the Article, feel "uncomfortable"
with the term. See Aya Gruber, A "Neo-Feminist" Assessment of Rape and Domestic
Violence Law Reform, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 583, 585 n.8 (2012). It is true that the
prefix "neo" is often used by critics to describe not just a new, but a radicalized and
dangerous form of an already negative movement, for example, "neo-Nazi,"
"neoconservative," "neoliberal." See, eg., Fritz K Koehler, Investment in the New German
Federal States, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 495, 502 n.17 (1992) ("neo-Nazi"); Sumi Cho,
1330 [50:5
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The purpose of this Article is to introduce the concept of
neofeminism into academic and political discourse. In doing so, it
broadly describes the patterns of thought that culminated in a
neofeminist moment, discusses the animating principles of
neofeminism, and examines how neofeminism fits into the larger
feminist movement. Part I will briefly elucidate the main
theoretical interventions of second-wave feminism, beginning
with a description of liberal feminism and moving to an analysis
of two well-known theories that respond to the limits of the
liberal program--cultural feminism and dominance feminism.
From these examinations, Part II will distill several feminist
"orthodoxies," meaning certain principles with which second-
wave feminism, or even feminism generally, is often associated in
academic, social, and political discourse. It will also highlight the
problematic, or at least double-edged, nature of these
orthodoxies. Parts III and IV explore the operation of neofeminist
ideology and how it responds to feminist orthodoxy by examining
the debate over domestic violence reform. Finally, the Article
concludes with a discussion of the nature of the neofeminist
moment, whether it is really new, and how recognizing such a
moment might impact the feminist movement.
II. SECOND-WAVE FEMINISM
Second-wave feminism is not a singular overarching theory
of justice. Rather, the term describes a body of differing
theoretical work within a temporal time frame, namely the 1960s
up until the 1990s.2 3 Within that period, there were several
feminist schools of thought, ranging from purely liberal (those
Post-Racialism, 94 IOwA L. REV. 1589, 1598 (2009) ("neoconservative"); LOC WACQUANT,
PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 305 (2009)
("neoliberal"). However, this is not always the case. The term "neosoul," for example,
describes a very positive evolution in the soul and R & B musical genre. See Ben Ratliff,
Music; Out of a Rut and Into a New Groove, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2000, § 2, at I
(describing "neo-soul" artists as the "antidote to the sameness problem: their records are
more well-rounded, more musicianly, more complete"). Another example comes from
contemporary international law scholarship, where the term "neoconstitutionalism"
signifies a "post-positivist" view of constitutionalism in which constitutions become "the
pathways through which moral values migrate from the ethical to the legal world." Luis
Roberto Barroso, The Americanization of Constitutional Law and Its Paradoxes:
Constitutional Theory and Constitutional Jurisdiction in the Contemporary World, 16
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 579, 586-87 (2010).
23. See Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage: Language and Status
in Family Law, 85 IND. L.J. 893, 950 (2010) (describing the "second wave" of feminism as
"stretching from the 1960s until the 1990s"); Jane E. Larson, Introduction: Third Wave-
Can Feminists Use the Law to Effect Social Change in the 1990s?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1252,
1252 n.1 (1993) ("The term 'Second Wave' is used to refer to the second broad-based
feminist movement in the history of the United States, beginning in the late 1960s.").
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dedicated to giving women "equal" rights to men)24 to extremely
radical (those calling for an overhaul of the "male" legal and
social structure).' Rather than describing in detail all the
feminist writings of the second wave, which is clearly beyond the
scope of this Article, this Part concentrates on the second-wave
theories that legal scholars and others most readily describe as
"feminist" and have produced some of the most profound legal
changes-liberal feminism, cultural feminism, and dominance
feminism." From these theories and their interplay, Part II will
then distill certain "orthodoxies" that have evolved either by
conscious feminist efforts or by feminist efforts as they have been
shaped and transformed by litigation strategies, prevailing social
norms, government policies, and political agendas.
A. Liberal Feminism
The second wave of feminism really began with the women's
liberation and equal rights movements." These movements
embraced all the basic tenets of liberalism," such as the priority
of liberty, the assumption that humans are autonomous moral
agents, the belief that government does not have to ensure
substantive equality, the commitment to rights, and the
protection of a private realm." Accordingly, liberal feminism
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Part II.C.
26. See Martha Chamallas, Past as Prologue: Old and New Feminisms, 17 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 157, 158 (2010) (calling liberal, dominance, and cultural feminism the "Big
Three" of the "older feminisms"); Malinda L. Seymore, Isn't It a Crime: Feminist
Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1032, 1066-69
& nn.223-233 (1996) (dividing "the feminist legal movement into three principal strands:
(1) liberal feminism, (2) relational feminism, and (3) radical feminism"). The descriptions
of these schools of thought, given the nature of this project, are necessarily reductionist
and retrospective. They do not capture all of the richness of the internal debate within the
theories. Thus, it may actually turn out that what I am describing as neofeminism is
strikingly similar to some of the more nuanced existing permutations of liberal, cultural,
and dominance feminism. See supra text accompanying notes 330-33 (conceding that
neofeminism may not be new).
27. See RITA J. SIMON & GLORIA DANzIGER, WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA:
THEIR SUCCESSES, DISAPPOINTMENTS, AND ASPIRATIONS 4-5 (1991) (noting that second-
wave feminism "veered dangerously close to becoming a one-issue movement" focusing on
passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mary Ann
Mason, Beyond Equal Opportunity: A New Vision for Women Workers, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 393, 393 n.1 (1992) (observing the second wave of feminism's
principal "demand for strict equal rights with men in all spheres").
28. The term "liberal" is used throughout this Article to signify those things and
persons associated with liberal political philosophy. It is not used in the general colloquial
sense to mean anything progressive.
29. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1984) (noting that liberalism "conceivets] of persons as autonomous, self-
defining individuals possessing equal moral worth and dignity"); Robin West,
1332 [50:5
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stands for women's formal equality within the current social,
cultural, political, and legal structure and a commitment to
women's rights as the vehicle of empowerment.o However, the
theory also assumes that once women are granted rights or
opportunities, they can freely choose whether to exercise those
rights or take those opportunities." To a greater extent than
other feminisms, liberal feminism, like political liberalism,
accepts the public-private distinction and supports privacy (i.e.,
freedom from governmental scrutiny) as a right." In this view,
those things that "properly" belong in the realm of the private
should be immune from government and legal intervention." To
illustrate the impact of liberal feminist theory, we will examine
two of the more notable liberal feminist interventions, the right
to work movement and rape law reform, in turn.
One of the earliest second-wave feminist causes involved
liberating women from a life of forced domesticity." Liberal
feminists did not appear to question the prevalent notion that the
home, family, and "women's work" belong in the realm of the
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1988) (observing that liberal legalism
posits "an existential state of highly desirable and much valued freedom"). See generally
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix, passim (1974) (advocating a "minimal
state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement
of contracts, and so on").
30. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 159 (discussing liberal feminism's demand for
equal treatment of the sexes); Cyra Akila Choudhury, Empowerment or Estrangement?:
Liberal Feminism's Visions of the "Progress" of Muslim Women, 39 U. BALT. L. F. 153, 154
n.2 (2009) (noting that liberal feminists "share liberalism's political agenda of individual
autonomy, equal rights, and a commitment to liberal democracy"); Linda C. McClain,
"Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S.
CAL L. REV. 1171, 1175 n.10 (1992) (observing the liberal feminist label attached to
litigation strategies advocating "formal equality").
31. See Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism,
1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 32-33 (1999) (observing that "[1liberal feminism assumes that
people are autonomous individuals making decisions in their own self-interest" and thus
"[tihe solution to inequality between women and men is to offer individuals the same
choices regardless of sex").
32. Feminists put forward the right to privacy argument in the abortion
context, arguing that forbidding abortion infringed the fundamental right to privacy
inherent in the Constitution, and securing a victory in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). See Scott A. Moss & Douglas M. Raines, The Intriguing Federalist Future of
Reproductive Rights, 88 B.U. L. REV. 175, 186 (2008) (describing the strategic choice
to frame Roe in privacy rather than gender equality).
33. Unlike left and dominance feminism, which critique privacy as inherently
indeterminate and political, see infra note 53 and accompanying text, liberal
feminism touts the value of privacy in many contexts. See Suzanne A. Kim,
Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 558 (2006) ("[Lliberal
feminists point to the value of privacy as a shield against governmental and societal
coercion . . .").
34. See generally BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
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private." Rather, they sought to facilitate the legal conditions
under which women with enough wherewithal could escape from
this private realm, under the presumption that escape from
oppressive private life is what women want." Reformers called on
legislatures and courts to reverse laws that erected de jure
barriers to women working outside the home and laws that
subordinated women to men within the workplace." At that time,
the feminist strategy was not to indict workplace standards as
inherently biased toward men but rather to emphasize that
women, like men, could meet existing standards."
Liberal feminists pursued this sameness argument even in
the face of seemingly obvious biological differences like
pregnancy." In many cases, pregnancy represents a uniquely
female condition that operatively prevents women from meeting
"objective" work standards.' Second-wave feminists nonetheless
took up two liberal strategies to allow pregnant women to keep
their jobs without stepping outside the liberal paradigm. Some
35. See Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L.
REV. 955, 967 n.31, 1019 (1993) ("Liberal feminists wish to retain the categories of
public and private, but render them gender-neutral."); Robin L. West, Constitutional
Scepticism, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765, 775 (1992) (asserting that liberal feminist's concern
over government regulation of private activities made them underestimate the harm
of private domestic ordering).
36. See, e.g., FRIEDAN, supra note 34, at 194 (calling domestic life a "waste of a
human self"); see also Chamallas, supra note 26, at 159 ("The central theme [of liberal
feminism] was providing legal and cultural support for .. . the woman breaking into male-
dominated domains. . . ."). Although the explicit project of liberal feminism was to remove
barriers to entry into the working world, in order to facilitate choice, many see the theory
as accepting, and even emphasizing, the higher status conferred on nondomestic labor.
37. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 159 ("The line of cases in the United States
Supreme Court that dismantled gender classifications in the law-those equal protection
cases litigated by women's rights lawyers such as Ruth Bader Ginsburg-were all about
getting rid of 'separate spheres' ideology and challenging traditional gender roles."
(footnote omitted)).
38. See Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory,
2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 75, 101 (1993) (observing that liberal feminism emphasizes
sameness); Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the
Fence Between Western Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 49, 97-98 (1993) (asserting that liberal feminism may be a palatable form of social
change because it "seeks gender neutrality" when "gender neutrality is simply the male
standard" (emphasis omitted)); see also HOOKS, supra note 2, at 21 (contending that
liberal feminism "aims to grant women greater equality of opportunity within the present
white supremacist, capitalist, patriarchal state").
39. See Nora Christie Sandstad, Pregnant Women and the Fourteenth Amendment:
A Feminist Examination of the Trend to Eliminate Women's Rights During Pregnancy, 26
LAw & INEQ. 171, 194 (2008) (observing that liberal feminism "requires the state to treat
pregnant women the same as other individuals").
40. See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1279, 1306 (1987) ("Legal equality analysis 'runs out' when it encounters 'real' difference,
and only becomes available if and when the difference is analogized to some experience
men can have too.").
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analogized pregnancy to any short-term medical issue that could
afflict a man and argued that women should have medical leave
on the same terms as men." Others asserted that the real need
for leave is related to childrearing rather than bearing, such that
both men and women, who could equally rear a child, should be
able to demand child-care leave." The federal law regarding
pregnancy adopts the liberal view. The Pregnancy Discrimination
Act prohibits employers from assuming that pregnant women
cannot work and firing them for their condition, but it does not
require accommodation.43 The Family and Medical Leave Act
requires employers to allow men and women to take a certain
amount of leave time for a variety of family and medical issues,
not just pregnancy."
Liberal feminists took a similar approach to rape law. While
sexual intercourse and issues related to sex and reproduction
remained strictly in the realm of the private, there was one legal
regulation of sex that liberal feminists championed: consent." In
the liberal mindset, sex was acceptable so long as it was a
product of agreement between two presumptively equal and
autonomous adults." As a consequence, liberal feminists
supported criminal laws that defined rape as sex in the absence
of consent or sex under conditions where the victims consent is
41. See id. (noting that feminists achieved the Pregnancy Discrimination Act "by
making pregnancy look similar to something men experienced as well-disability"); see
also Ashe & Cahn, supra note 38, at 101 (asserting that liberal feminists treat pregnancy
"as merely one of a multitude of physical disabilities that both women and men may
experience").
42. Ashe & Cahn, supra note 38, at 101-02 (discussing liberal feminists' support for
parental rather than maternity leave on the ground that "mothers should not receive
special treatment"); West, supra note 29, at 22 (noting that liberal feminists have pursued
the strategy of "denyling] or minimiz[ing] the importance of the pregnancy difference").
43. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). The
PDA prohibits discrimination "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" which includes
"pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
44. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54
(2006). The FMLA allows employees to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in order to
care for, inter alia, a newborn, a sick immediate family member, or the employee herself if
she has a serious medical condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2006).
45. See Robin West, Desperately Seeking a Moralist, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1,
22 (2006) (observing that for liberal feminists, "[clonsensual sex, no matter what its
other attributes, is not rape, so it does not impose rape's harms"); see also Susan E.
Thompson, Note, Prostitution-A Choice Ignored, 21 WoMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 217, 238
(2000) ("Tlhe liberal feminist advocates consensual sex between individuals as long
as no one gets hurt in the process.").
46. See, e.g., Sherry Young, Getting to Yes: The Case Against Banning
Consensual Relationships in Higher Education, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 269, 292
(1996) (contending that university students have the capacity to consent to sexual
relations with professors).
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physically compelled."' Liberal feminists also called for formal
equality in prosecutions of rape. They argued that rape should be
treated like any other crime of violence involving a victim." As
such, courts and legislatures should eliminate "special" rules for
rape cases, such as laws presuming the incredibility of rape
complaints in the absence of corroboration or presuming consent
in the absence of resistance.4 9 There, however, the liberal
intervention ended. It was apparently not part of the liberal
project to question whether women could truly exercise agency in
the sex contexto or account for police, prosecutor, and juror bias
despite formal legal equality.
The criticisms of liberal feminism, many of which adopt the
basic critique of liberalism, are legion. Critics of liberalism assert
that its commitment to formal equality does little to achieve
substantive equality given pre-existing social, cultural, and
economic conditions." Moreover, they argue that "rights" are
subject to indeterminate political interpretations and that
bolstering "rights-talk" can undercut antisubordination claims."
In addition, critics of liberalism have long maintained that the
distinction between the public and private is arbitrary and serves
to hide and legitimate hierarchy."
47. Morrison Torrey, Feminist Legal Scholarship on Rape: A Maturing Look at One
Form of Violence Against Women, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 35, 38-39 (1995).
48. See, e.g., SuSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 377
(1975) (asserting that rape should be "placed where it truly belongs, within the context of
modern criminal violence"); Torrey, supra note 47, at 38-39 (observing that liberal
feminists adopted the gender neutral characterization of rape as criminal violence).
49. See Gruber, Rape, Feminism, supra note 20, at 593 (discussing the feminist role
in eliminating resistance and corroboration requirements); Torrey, supra note 47, at 39
(noting that these legal changes "[rlespond[ed] to liberal feminist demands for reform").
50. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
171-72, 174-75 (1989) ("The law of rape presents consent as free exercise of sexual choice
under conditions of equality of power without exposing the underlying structure of
constraint and disparity.").
51. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1181-84 (1986) (asserting that
formal equality does not account for rape myths).
52. See Littleton, supra note 40, at 1307 (noting the critique that "challenges the
assumed gender-neutrality of social institutions, as well as the notion that practices must
distinguish themselves from 'business as usual' in order to be seen as unequal" (emphasis
omitted)).
53. See April L. Cherry, Choosing Substantive Justice: A Discussion of "Choice,"
"Rights" and the New Reproductive Technologies, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 431, 438-39
(1997) (noting that feminists must remain cognizant that the rights they seek do not lead
to further subordination). Frances Olsen asserts that the emphasis on rights in the rape
context oriented feminism toward a debate between sexual freedom and social control
rather than "challenging the dominant definition of sexuality." Frances Olsen, Statutory
Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 390 (1984).
54. See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 11-12, 42 (1992) ("[The identification of something as 'private' or 'public' may be
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Applying these critiques to our two examples, nonliberal
second-wave feminists argued that work rights cannot secure
women's equality because they fail to address subtle workplace
discrimination, do not account for the myriad of reasons why
women feel compelled to stay home, and regard male-centric
standards as neutral." They also objected to liberal feminism's
apparent glorification of the male work structure, which
continued to relegate domestic work to a private, unscrutinized,
and subordinate realm." In the rape context, critics contended
that emphasizing consent and formal equality in rape law does
nothing to address subtle coercion or account for the de facto
influence of sexist stereotypes and rape myths at trial."
Scholars of color and class-conscious feminists also
scrutinize the limits of liberal feminism. Critical race feminists
point out that black women have always worked outside their
homes, often in order to facilitate the very boredom and leisure
from which savvy upper-middle-class housewives seek to
escape." Racial scholars also critique second-wave feminists, both
liberal and nonliberal, for ignoring the historical fact of black
men's persecution under strict rape laws in formulating rape
prosecution policies." Class critics and Marxist feminists reject
liberal feminism's embrace of the liberal rights structure at the
expense of pursuing distributive strategies and larger critiques of
conclusory, a mere invocation to justify a conclusion actually reached on other grounds.");
Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction,
10 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 322 (1993) ("[AI1 private action can be made to look public and
vice versa.").
55. See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 797, 832-34
(1989) (observing that the liberal push toward market work combined with the cultural
pressure on women to stay home leads women "to make choices that marginalize them
economically in order to fulfill those same responsibilities").
56. See June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist
Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 975 (1991)
(observing that in the liberal feminist program, "the traditional domestic role, and those
who continued to pursue it, were devalued").
57. See MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 172-73; Gruber, Rape, Feminism, supra note
20, at 600 (observing the "reality of stereotyping and subtle sexism [in rape prosecutions],
despite the apparent achievement of formal equality").
58. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom: Low-Income
Mothers' Decisions About Work at Home and in the Market, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1029,
1036-37 (2004) (observing that the right to work philosophy "disregards the experiences
of most women of color" given that "[b]lack women historically experienced work outside
the home primarily as an aspect of racial subordination and the home primarily as a site
of solace and resistance to white oppression").
59. See Capers, supra note 16, at 1367; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 601 (1990) (asserting that feminists have
ignored black women's "unique ambivalence" to rape criminalization created by the
history of "victimization of black men by a system that has consistently ignored violence
against women while perpetrating it against men").
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the capitalist system." Nevertheless, the most famous critiques
of liberal feminism are lodged in the writings of cultural and
dominance feminists. We will now turn to a discussion of cultural
and then dominance feminism and will return to the other left
critiques when we examine the second-wave orthodoxies in the
next Part.
B. Cultural Feminism
The basic premise of cultural (also called "relational" or
"difference") feminism is that women have a different culture and
even a different epistemology (different ethics, ideas, and
language) from men-one that involves valuing intimacy,
prioritizing relationships over competition, and being caring
rather than dominating." Thus, cultural feminism directly
undermines liberal feminism's main premise that women can and
should compete on the same terms as men in the workplace.
Cultural feminism has become so well-known and prominent in
feminist circles that some have called it the "official" theory of
the second wave."
The seminal text on cultural feminism is Carol Gilligan's In
a Different Voice." The book is not really a theory of morality or a
prescription for legal, economic, or social reform. Rather, it
consists of reports of qualitative studies of individual women's
reactions to a variety of moral issues and the observation that
women literally speak in a different voice." According to Gilligan,
women are communicative rather than aggressive;" value
relationships and self-sacrifice over individual interests;" and are
nonhierarchical and unconcerned with accruing differential
power. The book concludes that
[bly positing . .. two different modes [male and female],
we arrive at a more complex rendition of human
60. See HOOKS, supra note 2, at 20 (arguing that liberal feminists' "belief that
women can achieve equality with men of their class without challenging and changing the
cultural basis of group oppression" negates feminism's "potential radicalism").
61. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 162 ("Cultural feminists emphasized
relationships, the value of intimacy, the importance of mothering and caretaking, and
other feminine activities.").
62. West, supra note 29, at 28 (calling cultural feminism the "dominant feminist
dogma"); see also Chamallas, supra note 26, at 162 (noting that cultural feminism "went
down easy" and inspired a "boatload of articles and studies").
63. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id. at 61.
66. Id. at 62.
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experience which sees the truth of separation and
attachment in the lives of women and men and
recognizes how these truths are carried by different
modes of language and thought."
Gilligan does not address the origin of the unique female
epistemology or make any direct normative assessments of it,
although the tone of her book indicates she believes these traits
are particularly valuable. Others, like Robin West, have
addressed more directly the nature of female preferences and the
normative quality of these predispositions." West, for example,
has written that women's tendency to value intimacy and
interconnectedness over individualism can be attributed to their
biological "experiences of breast feeding, nurturing, [and] caring
for and loving the weak so as to make the weak healthy."" She
has also posited a "feminist, maternalist (and humanist) moral
theory" that prioritizes caring and communitarianism.o
Instead of characterizing women's engagement in
housework, care work, and childrearing as something inherently
undesirable from which women should be liberated, cultural
feminism describes those things as positive and endemic aspects
of women's existence." In fact, cultural feminists often regard
such endeavors as more morally valuable than men's outside-the-
home pursuits.72 As a consequence, in the work arena, cultural
feminism's normative theory could possibly, although not
necessarily, dictate some radical policy changes. Potential
cultural feminist reforms might include requiring higher wages
67. Id. at 173-74.
68. See Ashe & Cahn, supra note 38, at 104; Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social
Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 80-81 (1989).
69. West, supra note 68, at 80; see also West, supra note 29, at 2-3 ("[W]omen are in
some sense 'connected' to life and to other human beings during at least four recurrent
and critical material experiences: the experience of pregnancy itself; the invasive and
'connecting' experience of heterosexual penetration, which may lead to pregnancy; the
monthly experience of menstruation, which represents the potential for pregnancy; and
the post-pregnancy experience of breast-feeding.").
70. West, supra note 68, at 80.
71. See Ashe & Cahn, supra note 38, at 104 ("[Cultural feminists] tend to celebrate
women's positive values to a degree that erases certain negative aspects of women's
experience and activity."); West, supra note 29, at 18 ("Cultural feminists, to their credit,
have reidentified these differences as women's strengths, rather than women's
weaknesses.").
72. See West, supra note 29, at 18 (describing cultural feminism's most "vital" claim
as the assertion that "intimacy is not just something women do, it is something human
beings ought to do"); see also Linda Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism:
The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNs 405, 408 (1988) (observing that cultural
feminists reappropriate female nature "in an effort to revalidate undervalued female
attributes").
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13 14for domestic work," compensating stay-at-home wives,
mandating paid maternity and even paternity leave, 7  and
infusing governmental and business decisionmaking with
compassion and cooperation.76 Nevertheless, it appears that the
cultural feminist intervention has primarily resulted in less
controversial legal and policy changes" in the form of
accommodations-accommodations for pregnancy, childcare, and
physical differences."
Of course, the notion that the female condition must be
"accommodated" naturally troubles liberal feminists. Liberal
feminists emphasize that women are similarly situated to men,
deserve equal rights, and do not need special privileges.7 ' Thus,
to many feminists, the cultural feminist contribution represents
a return to gender stereotypes and the notion of separate spheres
in which women primarily belong in the home." Wendy Williams,
73. Chamallas, supra note 26, at 165 ("I see the imprint of cultural feminism all
over the caregiver guidance and the family responsibility lawsuits, despite the liberal
framework in which anti-discrimination laws currently operate. Such claims make sense
only if one accepts that caring for family members is as valuable to society as paid
employment and that women should not have to sacrifice their families for their work.").
74. See id.; see also, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 80 (1997) ("Valuing all mothers' domestic labor involves
challenging ... the false dichotomy between the spheres of home and work . . . .")
75. See Mary Becker, Caring for Children and Caretakers, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1495, 1513 (2001) (noting "maternalist" feminist support for mandatory paid maternity
and parental leave).
76. See West, supra note 68, at 81; ef Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts
on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 888-
91 (1990) (rejecting a paternalistic form of legal intervention in favor of an alternative
feminist reform of judicial intervention that equalizes the powers of the respective
parties).
77. See HOOKS, supra note 2, at 37 (observing that feminism's radical effort to
transform family life "by its insistence that the purpose of family structure is not to
reinforce patterns of domination in the interest of the state" has been the most
controversial and resisted by mainstream society).
78. See Linda Kelly Hill, The Feminist Misspeak of Sexual Harassment, 57 FLA.
L. REV. 133, 138-39 (2005) (noting cultural feminism's emphasis on legal
accommodations "for women on account of their caregiving nature"); see also Theresa
A. Gabaldon, Assumptions About Relationships Reflected in the Federal Securities
Laws, 17 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 215, 217-18 (2002) (observing that cultural feminists'
analytic method "arouses empathy and exposes nuance permitting situational
accommodations").
79. See, e.g., Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive
Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 32-33 (1999); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality
Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 14 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP.
151, 170 (1992) (noting that the "special treatment model has great costs" because it
permits "unfavorable as well as favorable treatment").
80. Williams, supra note 55, at 806 ("[Cultural feminism's] attempt to
rehabilitate traditional stereotypes as 'women's voice,' and to associate women's voice
with the new epistemology, fails to come to terms with the extent to which the gender
stereotypes were designed to marginalize women. These stereotypes no doubt
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for example, queries whether the cultural feminist position on
maternity leave represents a "clinging, without really reflecting
upon it, to culturally dictated notions that underestimate the
flexibility and potential of human beings of both sexes and which
limit us as a class and as individuals."81
There are also a myriad of nonliberal critiques set forth by
dominance, race, class, and other feminists questioning cultural
feminism's epistemological (and perhaps even metaphysical)
conclusion that women are authentically and inherently caring
and domestic." Moreover, theorists object to cultural feminism's
replacement of male supremacy with a form of female supremacy
stemming from the purportedly superior biological and emotional
characteristics of women." We will explore the dominance
feminism critique of cultural feminism below and some of the
others when we discuss the second-wave orthodoxies in the next
Part.
C. Dominance Feminism
Catherine MacKinnon proposed the dominance theory of
feminism as a response to what she saw as the two then-existing
paths to women's equality, namely "be the same as men" or "be
different from men."4 Thus, dominance feminism is a critique of
both liberal and cultural feminism. Turning first to MacKinnon's
analysis of liberal feminism, she does confess "a sincere affection for
this approach" because the claim that women had been treated
disparately in fact resulted in significant changes in women's status
and opportunities." Nonetheless, MacKinnon describes liberalism
as an intervention of limited use because the standards by which
"equal" competitors are evaluated, whether inside or outside the
employment context, have always been defined with reference to
articulated some values shunted aside by Western culture. But the circumstances of
their birth mean they presented a challenge to predominant Western values that was
designed to fail, and to marginalize women in the process.").
81. Williams, supra note 79, at 173.
82. See, e.g., Littleton, supra note 40, at 1333 (observing the argument that "the
socially female cannot be claimed as truly belonging to women, because it has been
men who have done the defining"); infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Janet Halley, The Politics of Injury: A Review of Robin West's
Caring for Justice, 1 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 65, 76 (2005), available at
http://www.legalleft.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/1unb065-halley.pdf.
84. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex
Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32, 32-33
(1987); see also MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 18-
19 (2d ed. 2003) (referring to dominance feminism as radical feminism).
85. MACKINNON, supra note 84, at 35.
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the male condition." In fact, the whole liberal structure, which
prizes autonomous competition, objective standards, and negative
rights, reinforces and hides the presumption of the male condition"
Moreover, MacKinnon passionately critiques liberal feminists'
preservation of the public-private distinction. In her view, "[flor
women, the private is the distinctive sphere of intimate violation
and abuse, neither free nor particularly personal. Men's realm of
private freedom is women's realm of collective subordination."
MacKinnon's main criticism of cultural feminism regards the
notion that caring and intimacy is a true and authentic quality of
womanhood." For MacKinnon, inequality is not just embedded in
and perpetuated by the liberal state." Rather, what has come to be
known as the "patriarchy," a structural system of norms, practices,
discourses, instincts, and signals that keep men dominant and
women subordinate, exists symbiotically with law.91 As a result,
women's self-conception is not something separate from the
operation of male domination-it is the product of such
domination." MacKinnon accordingly criticizes cultural feminism
for "making it seem as though [female] attributes, with their
consequences, really are somehow ours, rather than what male
supremacy has attributed to us for its own use."" She argues that
"[for women to affirm difference, when difference means
dominance, as it does with gender, means to affirm the qualities
and characteristics of powerlessness."" Moreover, women's "choice"
is not indicative of equality precisely because "women have little
choice but to become persons who then freely choose women's
roles."
86. Id. at 36 ("For each of [men's] differences from women, what amounts to an
affirmative action plan is in effect, otherwise known as the structure and values of
American society.").
87. See id. (asserting that "liberal idealism" is sexist because "virtually every
quality that distinguishes men from women is already affirmatively compensated in this
society").
88. MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 168; see also Dailey, supra note 35, at 1020
(observing that radical feminists view privacy as a "dangerous tool of gender oppression,
shielding private abuse from social view").
89. MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 47-49.
90. Id. at 237-38.
91. See MAcKINNON, supra note 50, at 237-38; Robin L. West, Law's Nobility, 17
YALE J.L. & FEMiNISM 385, 421 (2005) (describing patriarchy in dominance feminism as
"the ubiquitous controls of women's work, reproduction, children, and property, across
cultures and across time, [which] are aimed at the appropriation of female sexuality").
92. See MACKINNON, supra note 84, at 39 ("Women value care because men have
valued us according to the care we give them .....
93. Id. at 38-39.
94. Id. at 39.
95. MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 124.
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Clearly, the ubiquitous patriarchy is the problem. However,
one would think that fighting the patriarchy, with all its
subtleties, forms, entrenched institutions, and linguistic and
sublinguistic signals, would be an impossible task. And yet,
dominance feminism has produced some of the most tangible and
concrete law reforms of any theory of feminism, including sexual
harassment laws in the work context and rape shield laws in the
gender crime context.96 This may be because the theory reduces
women's subordination to one particular factor: sexuality." In
MacKinnon's view, sexuality is as much feminism's benchmark of
oppression of women as labor is Marxism's benchmark of
oppression of the lower classes." Women are in an inherently
subordinate position because sexual oppression is constitutive of
the very gender category, woman." Thus, "every feminist issue,
every injustice and injury suffered by women, devolves upon
sexuality; . . . sexual harassment, rape, and prostitution are all
modes of sexual subordination; women's lack of authoritative
speech is women's always already sexually violated condition."'9
Dominance feminism sees the key to remedying women's
unequal status as reconfiguring power.' It counsels for the
strategic invocation of rights-talk, despite its critique of
liberalism, 2 and use of police power, despite its description of
96. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 162 ("[D]ominance feminism has proved to be
remarkably generative, providing the inspiration for new laws on stalking and domestic
violence and significant changes in laws related to rape, sexual assault, and sex
trafficking."); see also Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysts of Character
Evidence in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 689 (1998).
97. See MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 109 ("[Fleminism fundamentally identifies
sexuality as the primary social sphere of male power."); see also Franke, supra note 19, at
198 ("For MacKinnon, all gender is always already about sexuality, and all sexuality is
always already about gender. And both gender and sexuality are entirely about women's
subordination to men.").
98. See MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 3 ("Sexuality is to feminism what work is to
marxism: that which is most one's own, yet most taken away.").
99. See id. at 128, 195 (calling sexuality "constitutive of the meaning of gender" and
asserting that sexualization "is a central feature of women's social definition as inferior
and feminine"); MACKINNON, supra note 84, at 42 ("[Glender is an inequality first,
constructed as a socially relevant differentiation in order to keep that inequality in
place. . . ."); see also ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 122-23 (1987) ("The slit between [a
woman's] legs . .. which means entry into her-intercourse-appears to be the key to
women's lower human status.").
100. See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE
MODERNITY 81 (1995).
101. See MACKINNON, supra note 84, at 40 ("Gender is also a question of power,
specifically of male supremacy and female subordination.").
102. Id. at 45 (defining the goal of the dominance approach to "give women equal
power in social life"); see also supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (critiquing
liberalism).
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the state as masculinist.o' Dominance feminism unabashedly
calls upon the state to authoritatively, even violently, enforce
true equality by stamping out instances of male sexual
domination.o' Curiously, although the theory embraces the state
as an enforcer of prohibitory laws, it does not particularly
champion state-sponsored redistribution to secure women's
economic empowerment. Perhaps this is due to MacKinnon's
complicated relationship with socialism, which she regards as
having disserved or at least ignored women, and her view of
distributive reform as reifying women's low status. "'
For MacKinnon, the left's focus on class and capitalism came
at the expense of focusing on male dominance, "the most
pervasive and tenacious system of power in history."'6 She
critiques West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Supreme Court
case upholding minimum wages for female laborers and
commonly regarded as spelling the end to the Lochner era."' The
Court refused to apply Lochner's logic that adult workers should
be at liberty to enter into any kind of contract and instead
reasoned that "[t]he exploitation of a class of workers [women]
who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power
103. See MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 161-62 ("The state is male in the feminist
sense: the law sees and treats women the way men see and treat women." (footnote
omitted)). However, the problem with the state is its liberal nature, in which "objectivity
is its norm." Id. at 162. Thus, MacKinnon has no qualms about engaging the state, in a
way that many see as not neutral, in order to secure women's equality. In addition,
because male supremacy is established by "the systemic failure of the state to enforce the
rape law," more criminal law is the natural prescription. Id. at 245-46.
104. See MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 249. MacKinnon states,
Equality will require change, not reflection-a new jurisprudence, a new relation
between life and law.... To the extent feminist law embodies women's point of
view, it will be said that its law is not neutral. But existing law is not
neutral.. .. Women have never consented to its rule ....
Id.; see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Engaged Scholarship as Method and Vocation, 22
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 193, 202 (2010) (stating that unlike postmodern scholarship which
"makes an effort to be as distant from the real world of the law's lived roots and impact as
it possibly can," her work has served as a basis for international "litigation, prosecution,
and adjudication" interventions, which "generat[ed] new definitions of and accountability
for rape"). Janet Halley terms Catherine MacKinnon's international interventions
"Governance Feminism," which is a "very state-centered, top-down, sovereigntist"
feminism that "emphasizes criminal enforcement," "speaks the language of total
prohibition," and "envisions the legal levers it pulls as activating a highly monolithic and
state-centered form of power." Halley et al., supra note 19, at 340-41.
105. See MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 13. MacKinnon reads Marx as adhering to
stereotypical views of women as "defined by nature, not by society," that is, "primarily as
mothers, housekeepers, and members of the weaker sex." Id. She critiques Engels for
failing to see the special role of gender (rather than just capitalism) in shaping women's
status in society. Id. at 36.
106. Id. at 116-18.
107. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937); MACKINNON, supra
note 50, at 165.
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and are thus relatively defen[sleless against the denial of a living
wage . .. casts a direct burden for their support upon the
community."os MacKinnon does recognize that Parrish "did do
something for some workers (female) concretely" and "help[ed]
the working class by setting precedents that eventually
supported minimum-wage and maximum-hours laws for all
workers.""' However, she ultimately rejects this feminist-labor
alliance. Because Parrish noted the special vulnerability of
women due to their cultural, biological, and social conditions,
MacKinnon concludes that the case was a "victory against
capitalism and for sexism ... for the working class perhaps at
women's expense.""o
In the end, MacKinnon cast a skeptical eye on a case that
tangibly benefitted women but may have reinforced gender roles.
However, she fails to cast that same jaundiced eye upon criminal
prosecution, which tends to reinforce the most sexist (and racist)
stereotypes of women in order to show that they are "real
victims.""' Given dominance feminism's preference for
prohibition over distribution, it is not surprising that the theory
is most readily associated with sexual harassment prohibitions
and special rules facilitating rape prosecution."'
III. THE SECOND-WAVE ORTHODOXIES
This Part analyzes several notable ideologies that emerged
from the second wave of feminism. The reason I term these
principles "orthodoxies" is that they represent a set of beliefs that
is seen by many as quintessentially "feminist." Moreover, when
gender scholars critique or deviate from these orthodoxies, they
are sometimes called "antifeminist.""' The following orthodoxies
are not merely the obvious normative prescriptions from liberal,
cultural, and dominance feminism, although some of them are
108. Parrish, 300 U.S. at 392-93, 399.
109. MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 165.
110. Id. at 166 (discussing Parish, 300 U.S. at 394).
111. See MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 244-46; Estrich, supra note 51, at 1114 n.72
(discussing the court's focus in State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981), as "whether [the
victim was] a real victim" as opposed to whether the defendant was a rapist); infra note
243 and accompanying text.
112. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
AND WHAT TO Do ABouT IT 254 (2000) (noting MacKinnon's emphasis on rape, sexual
harassment, and domestic violence over work and family issues).
113. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State:
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, in FEMINISM & METHODOLOGY 135, 136 & 150-51 n.5
(Sandra Harding ed., 1987); see also Wini Breines, Margaret Cerullo, & Judith Stacey,




clearly embedded in those theories. Rather, these orthodoxies
include principles implied by the nature of the theories, messages
that logically but perhaps unintentionally flowed from them, and
ideas that developed as second-wave feminism translated into
real world policies. As discussed in Part IV, the feminist program
has often included compromises in which reformers capitalize on
other hierarchies to advance the feminist agenda. Indeed, the
most careful, nuanced, and intricate theory can be perverted,
flattened, and distorted when filtered through the prevailing
social, economic, cultural, political, and legal structure.
A. The Essential Woman
Probably the most well-known and hotly contested second-
wave orthodoxy is the notion that there is an essential female
experience."4 According to liberal feminism, all women
experience the oppression of being doomed to a life of domesticity
and desire liberation from this oppression through working
outside the home." Moreover, liberal feminism views women as
autonomous agents who, in the absence of de jure barriers, are
equal to men in the ability to work outside the home."' In short,
the essential nature of women is one of "sameness" to men."
Many theorists oppose not only liberal feminism's particular
view of the quintessential female experience but also its
implication that there is a quintessential female experience. As
mentioned above, race scholars point out that minority,
immigrant, and poor women have historically had and continue
to have a very different relationship to working outside of the
home from white women."' Many women of color and otherwise
114. Angela Harris critiques both dominance and relational feminism for their
embrace of "the notion that a unitary, 'essential' women's experience can be isolated
and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of
experience." Harris, supra note 59, at 585. The problem with such essentialism, she
asserts, is "that the voices that are silenced turn out to be the same voices silenced by
the mainstream legal voice . . . -among them, the voices of black women," Id.
115. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text. But see Rosalind Dixon,
Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 277, 279 n.1
(2008) (observing "the commitments of many leading liberal feminist theorists to
substantive rather than formal equality").
118. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text; see also Joan Williams,
Implementing Antiessentialism: How Gender Wars Turn into Race and Class Conflict,
15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 41, 67 (1999) ("[T]he majority of black wage-earning
women, especially mothers and wives, usually did not believe that their presence or
their position in the labor force was an accurate reflection of who they were . . . ."
(quoting Sharon Hayley, When Your Work Is Not Who You Are: The Development of a
Working-Class Consciousness Among Afro-American Women, in GENDER, CLASS,
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marginalized women would choose to stay in the home and
care for their children rather than working, were it financially
possible. In fact, some would rather do anything other than the
low-paying, menial, and physically taxing tasks society assigns
to them."'
While cultural feminists object to the characterization of
the nature of female oppression within the liberal model, they
do not criticize the notion that there is an essential woman's
experience. Rather, cultural feminists simply inversely shift
the presumptions about the female condition. Instead of
desiring escape from the less valuable domestic realm, women
really desire (and are in fact biologically and culturally
predisposed) to engage in domestic work and be intimate and
caring.'2 0 In short, cultural feminism defines the essential
female experience as one of "difference" from men."' This
account of women's ontology proves disturbing to many
feminists and other theorists. Some point out that the
description of women as particularly intimate, communal, and
inclined to engage in care work proves inaccurate in many
instances."' Other scholars, particularly queer theorists,
oppose the female experience being described in terms of
pregnancy, breastfeeding, and diaper changing-activities that
many women do not and will not undertake.'
RACE, AND REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 42 (Nancy S. Dye & Noralee Frankel
eds., 1991))).
119. See Williams, supra note 118, at 55-56 ("Feminists' imagery of the family as the
locus of subordination seems most convincing to women otherwise privileged by class and
race; to working-class women, it may seem instead (or as well) a haven against the
injuries of class.").
120. See supra Part I.B.
121. See West, supra note 29, at 14 (noting cultural feminism's emphasis on
"women's fundamental material difference from men").
122. See, e.g., Marie Ashe, The "Bad Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem of
Representation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017, 1020 n.8 (1992) (noting that such
characterizations of women "can bolster destructive stereotypes or can divide women
among themselves by excluding some women from the scope of relevance of 'feminist
theory'"); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1040, 1050-54
(1992) (arguing that ascribing cultural feminist attributes to women "is not only
inaccurate, [but] dangerous"); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 617, 624-25 (1990) (suggesting that cultural feminism's description of women is not
supported empirically and can reinforce stereotypes).
123. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, in
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 263, 266 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991)
(contending that West's "list of 'connection' experiences ignores specifically lesbian
experiences of 'connection'"); Brenda Crossman, Sexuality, Queer Theory, and "Feminism
After": Reading and Rereading the Sexual Subject, 49 MCGILL L.J. 847, 864 (2004)
(describing queer theory feminism as critical to certain sexual practices that "disrupt




Dominance feminism also criticizes cultural feminism for its
assumption that Women are authentically and inherently caring
and intimate.124 Although cultural feminists may be correct that
woman's essential nature is relational, the problem is that so
long as the male gender has its "foot [on] our necks," we can
never really know "in what tongue women speak.""' Nonetheless,
dominance theory also implies that there is a unifying woman's
condition. All women are united in their oppression by the
patriarchy.'2 6 All women cannot exercise authentic agency or
have true self-knowledge in the face of male supremacy.'27 All
women are subordinated by sex with men."' Consequently,
dominance feminism may not pass on the woman's essential
voice, but it does describe a fundamental female experience as
one of perpetual sexual subordination."' As with the other
feminisms, dominance feminism's essentialist characterization of
women's subordination is the subject of criticism from racial
scholars, queer theorists, and others."' Critical race feminists
assert that black women often experience sexism in a materially
different way than white women and some find that male
domination is less subordinating to them than other forms, of
discrimination."' Similarly, queer theorist Patricia A. Cain
contends that dominance feminism overstates the role of male
sexual domination in many women's lives."' She notes that
lesbians may not feel nor in fact be fundamentally shaped by
124. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
125. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 45 (1987).
126. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
127. See MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 102-04. Dominance feminism's main
prescriptive program is "consciousness raising," that is, making women understand how
their situations, preferences, desires, and outlooks are inexorably and invariably shaped
by male supremacist forces. See id.
128. See Dixon, supra note 117, at 282.
129. See id. ("[Dominance feminists] argue that liberal feminist attempts to empower
women (or females), and cultural feminist attempts to revalue the feminine, are both
misguided because female identity and the feminine as we know it are the pure products
of a system of sexual subordination in which men defined themselves as subjects, and
women as objects, via pornography and other systematic practices of male-to-female rape,
prostitution, battering, and harassment.").
130. See, e.g., HOOKS, supra note 2, at 4 (contending that the dominant feminists
"have little or no understanding of white supremacy as a racial politic, of the
psychological impact of class, of their political status within a racist, sexist, capitalist
state").
131. See Harris, supra note 59, at 588-89; see also HOOKS, supra note 2, at 29-31.
132. Cain, supra note 123, at 266-67; see also Joan C. Williams, Reconstructive
Feminism: Changing the Way We Talk About Gender and Work Thirty Years After the
PDA, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 79, 113 (2009) (calling "indefensible" MacKinnon's "claim
that the eroticization of dominance is the central (and possibly only) dynamic of gender").
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subordinating interactions with men. '1 "Sex-positive" scholars
object to the claim that all women are oppressed by sex.'34 They
argue that, to the contrary, for many women, sex, even sex with
domination, can be a source of empowerment and pleasure."'
They also oppose MacKinnon's description of women as
objectified creatures, incapable of subjectivity in sexual
engagements with men."'
B. Good Women and Bad Men
A somewhat related orthodoxy stems from the nature of
these second-wave theories as grand narratives of women's
subordination.' Because the theories seek to describe an
overarching inequality between men and women, they have a
tendency to reject or ignore nuance and multiple axes of
subordination and instead adhere to reductionist notions of good
and bad.' In the liberal mindset, bad is being trapped in a
domestic realm, and good is competing with men in the
workplace. In the cultural feminist mindset, bad is the uncaring,
uncooperative culture of men, and good is the intimate, caring
culture of women.' In the dominance feminist mindset, bad is
men dominating women through sex, and good is the eradication
of such domination.140
To reduce the world of female subordination to these
flattened dichotomies, second-wave theories needed to embrace
133. See Cain, supra note 123, at 267 (asserting that it would "enrich [MacKinnon's]
theory to recognize the reality of non-subordination that some lesbians claim as their
experiential reality and ask about its relevance to her underlying theory").
134. Chamallas, supra note 26, at 166.
135. See Brenda Cossman et al., Gender, Sexuality, and Power: Is Feminist Theory
Enough?, 12 CoLUM. J. GENDER & L. 601, 605 (2003) ("[Tlthere have been powerful sex
liberationist, sex radical, and more recently 'sex positive' feminisms that understand
sexuality to be a domain of 'pleasure and danger' .... ).
136. See Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young
Women, Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 99, 153-55
(2007) (cataloging "third-wave" feminist accounts of female sexual subjectivity).
137. See Rhode, supra note 122, at 622 (noting that feminism purports to describe
"women's experience").
138. See Cain, supra note 123, at 272. Cain observes that feminist "theorists ought to
resist transforming a critical standpoint into a new all-encompassing version of reality"
because "what started as a useful critique of one privileged (male) view of reality may
become a substitute claim for a different privileged (female) view of reality." Id.; see also
Rhode, supra note 122, at 622 (asserting that feminism's construction of a unifying female
experience has imposed "prohibitive" costs on "those who are not white, heterosexual, and
economically privileged").
139. See Alcoff, supra note 72, at 408 ("For cultural feminists, the enemy of women is
not merely a social system or economic institution or set of backward beliefs but
masculinity itself and in some cases male biology.").
140. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
2013]1 1349
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
evermore hackneyed visions of women's and men's conditions.
The above Subpart discussed some of the essentialist images of
women, but what about those of men? For many cultural and
dominance feminists, men have occupied the role of enemy
number one-the sole entity responsible for female
subordination."' To prove that men are the source of women's
oppression-rather than capitalism, racism, xenophobia, or some
other negative but arguably ungendered force-dominance, and
to some extent cultural, feminism made some troubling
diagnostic moves.
First, the theories had to espouse hyperbolic descriptions of
men's evil natures and dictatorial, uncaring, and immoral
behavior."' In cultural feminism, men are operatively incapable
of being intimate."' In dominance feminism, men are gleeful
sexual harassers, rapists, and abusers.'" Second-wave feminism's
tendency to emphasize the most socially unacceptable male
behaviors ironically mirrored the concurrent conservative
strategy of publicizing horrible crimes in order to bolster tough-
on-crime policies."' It is doubtful that feminists deliberately
publicized egregious individual male behavior in order to
undermine arguments that link gender-based crime to
socioeconomic status."' Nonetheless, these feminist theories'
141. See HOOKS, supra note 2, at 25 (noting feminism's insistence "that men were
'the enemy,' the cause of all our problems"); Cheryl B. Preston, Consuming Sexism:
Pornography Suppression in the Larger Context of Commercial Images, 31 GA. L. REV.
771, 802 (1997) ("Inherent in some dominance feminism writing are notions of the male as
out of control, and as the enemy." (footnote omitted)).
142. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 125, at 220 (noting "the parade of horrors
demonstrating the systematic victimization of women"); Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men:
Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1046-47 (1996)
(asserting that for some cultural feminists "(clertain characteristics (female) are
celebrated, while others (male) are not").
143. See MACKINNON, supra note 125, at 220.
144. See id. at 1048 ("Under [dominance] theory, men subordinate, ignore, invade,
harass, vilify, use, and torture women. They are, quite literally, the bad guys.").
145. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and
the Progression Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 631, 725 (2004)
(observing how politicians use retributive rhetoric and tough-on-crime proposals to gain
popular support); David A Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming the Conservative Legal
Agenda, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2032, 2074 (2004) (asserting that modem conservatives justify
harsh criminal policies by advancing a binary view of morality in which there are inherently
good or bad people).
146. See Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary
Traumatic Stress and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y
& L. 567, 588 (2003). It may, however, have been a deliberate political choice to engage in such
rhetoric. In the domestic violence arena, for example, "[tihe simple and sensationalist story
lines encouraged by tragic cases of domestic violence and law and order frameworks also serve
media and political interests. Dramatic cases and 'tough on crime' policies are easily
communicated in the mass media and have ready appeal to voters." Id.
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characterizations of men tended to ignore issues of class, race,
and poverty." Consider feminists' condemnation of "sex
hassling" on the street.'4 8 One might wonder who would be
disciplined by a law prohibiting such behavior. Would it be the
power-holders on Wall Street and in Washington? One could
scarcely imagine corporate players and politicians lounging on
the corner in their three-piece suits cat-calling at women. Rather,
cat-calling is usually confined to the province of laborers-ethnic
men of lower income and socioeconomic status.
If it weren't for free speech concerns, perhaps there would be
laws outlawing cat-calling. As second-wave feminists discovered,
it is much easier to succeed in establishing laws in the name of
equality that disadvantage a certain subset of subordinated men
than to create laws that control the behavior of seemingly
"normal" men."' However, there is a real downside to second-
wavers' choice to emphasize heinous male crimes and "low-class"
machismo. Society could not ignore that sexual and domestic
abuse occur, and feminists were quite convincing that such
behavior is a matter of concern for all women."' At the same
147. See HOOKS, supra note 2, at 25-26 ("[W]hen we cease to focus on the simplistic
stance 'men are the enemy,' we are compelled to examine systems of domination and our
role in their maintenance and perpetuation.").
148. Robin West notes the "invisible" harm of street hassling in several articles. See,
e.g., West, Desperately Seeking, supra note 45, at 17; West, supra note 91, at 447; Robin L.
West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist
Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 149, 150, 162-63 (2000) [hereinafter West, Hedonic
Lives].
149. See Lynne Henderson, Co-Opting Compassion: The Federal Victim's Rights
Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579, 586-87 (1998) (observing that tough criminal
policies are propelled by "the image of the criminal [as] the ominous, if undifferentiated,
poor, angry, violent, Black, or Latino male"); Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy
Dressing and the Eroticization of Domination, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1309, 1321 (1992) ("A
common popular assessment of sexual abuse is that . .. the abuser is not normal."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality,
and the Rule of Law's Uncertain Fate in Modern Society, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 759, 788 (2005)
("[N]otions of what is wrong, what is socially harmful, and what is proper punishment
reflect political choices that disfavor lower class people . . . .").
150. See Lisa Tenerowicz, Note, Student Misconduct at Private Colleges and
Universities: A Roadmap for "Fundamental Fairness" in Disciplinary Proceedings, 42 B.C.
L. REV. 653, 658 n.31 (2001) (observing the "oft-quoted October 1985 Ms. Magazine survey,
titled Date Rape: The Story of an Epidemic and Those Who Deny It, that found that one in
four college women is the victim of rape or attempted rape"); see also, e.g., Mary E.
Asmus, Tineke Ritmeester, & Ellen L. Pence, Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in
Duluth- Developing Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics of
Abusive Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 121 (1991) ("[Dlomestic violence occurs in
all socio-economic and racial groups."). But see Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do
We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered
Women, 23 ST. LOUIs U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 38 (2004) ("Women in low-income households
experience violence at significantly higher rates than women with higher annual
incomes." (footnote omitted)).
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time, society clearly could not see all men as abusers, raging
misogynists, and rapists. Wives did not see their husbands that
way; mothers did not see their sons that way; and men did not
see themselves that way. As a result, society was prepared to
actively engage with feminists in the fight against what it
perceived as the small, deviant subgroup of men who were that
way (like sexual predators)."' In turn, gender inequality became
even more insular in origin. It was not even just an acontextual
matter of what men do to women but merely a problem caused by
a "pathological subclass of men."' Ironically, then, publicizing
the worst cases of bad male sexual behavior undermined
dominance feminism's potential to address the myriad of ways in
which the patriarchy invisibly perpetuates subordination because
the world had been divided into normal men, who are not
sexually and otherwise dominating, and bad men, who are the
real problem.' As a consequence, another, perhaps unintended,
orthodoxy from the second wave consists of the notion that
feminism means fighting against bad, criminally deviant men.
C. The Criminal Law Solution
Feminists' publicizing of socially condemnable male behavior
appears to have triggered the typical social response-a desire
for the government to do something about it. Dominance
feminism is clear in its embrace of government intervention to
reverse the male-oriented power structure.' It is also relatively
evident it supports prohibitive rather than distributive strategies
to dismantle male supremacy.' In this sense, dominance
151. See Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence
in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 678 (1998) (observing the American cultural
paradigm that "'nice' (well educated, white, middle class, employed) men do not rape"
(footnote omitted)); see also, e.g., Meredith J. Duncan, Sex Crimes and Sexual Miscues:
The Need for a Clearer Line Between Forcible Rape and Nonconsensual Sex, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1112 (2007) (asserting that men engaging in nonconsensual sex
should not be punished as "rapists" because "society regards rapists as some of its worst
criminals").
152. Kennedy, supra note 149, at 1321.
153. See Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 809 ("The message criminal law
sends is that a distinct group of wicked people commit domestic violence and that once
these persons are managed, the problem is solved."); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1991) (noting
that judicial opinions "treat domestic violence as aberrant and unusual").
154. See Levit, supra note 142, at 1048 ("Radical feminism argues for dramatic social
transformation and redress of the [male/female] power imbalance."); supra notes 101-104
and accompanying text.
155. MacKinnon specifically advocates tougher criminal rape and domestic violence
laws and supports laws that criminalize pornography and civilly penalize sexual
harassment. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Trafficking, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L.
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feminism, despite its radical nature, has some synergy with
liberal feminism.'" While liberalism generally objects to a robust
role for the government in constructing the social order, even the
narrowest theories of liberalism, like libertarianism, make an
exception for government police intervention in the name of
preventing and punishing harms."' Thus, as long as a behavior is
deviant enough for society (or those in society who dictate policy)
to consider it criminal, the government may play a dominant role
in punishing it. Consequently, another orthodoxy of second-wave
feminism is the emphasis on utilizing prohibitive laws and
criminalization rather than distributive reforms and economic
empowerment to achieve feminist goals.
Cultural feminists, however, value cooperation,
egalitarianism, and self-sacrifice,"' which are more socialist in
nature."' One would therefore think that a cultural feminist
might consider the violent, adversarial, uncaring criminal system
as quintessentially male in origin and reject it.' As one expert
notes, "[fleminists, who champion empathy and connectedness,
993, 1010-11 & n.71 (2005) (noting that MacKinnon drafted a "legal provision that
squarely recognizes pornography as trafficking"). In addition, her stance is not that male
dominance be remediated but that it be reversed. Aya Gruber, A "Neo-Feminist"
Assessment of Rape and Domestic Violence Law Reform, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 583,
591-92 (2012) (asserting that dominance feminism is "associated most readily" with
MacKinnon, and that it "calls for the reversal of the gender power structure"); see
MACKINNON, supra note 84, at 44-45 (arguing that only when the fundamental issue of
male dominance is addressed may women truly gain equality). As Nancy Levit explains,
"For dominance theorists, gender equates with and is defined by power. They argue that
gender equality can only come through a shift in power: 'Equality means someone loses
power... . The mathematics are simple: taking power from exploiters extends and
multiplies the rights of those they have been exploiting.'" Levit, supra note 142, at 1049
(quoting ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL
RIGHTS: A NEw DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY 23 (1988)).
156. See HOOKS, supra note 2, at 9 (observing that feminism's embrace of
"competitive, atomistic liberal individualism" has undermined its radical potential
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
157. See White, supra note 149, at 819-20 (noting that liberalism rejects government
regulation and simultaneously seeks "expansion of the criminal justice system"). Thus,
the prevailing liberal regime is "a contradictory blend" supporting free market idealism
and "illiberal" social norms. Id.; see Eric Mack & Gerald F. Gaus, Classical Liberalism
and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL THEORY (Gerald
F. Gaus & Chandran Kukathas eds., 2004).
158. See Williams, supra note 55, at 813 ("Gilligan associates the male voice with the
pursuit of self-interest, and, therefore, with capitalism's central tenet that this pursuit
will benefit society as a whole."); supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
159. However, as a practical matter, identifying women as egalitarian and caring
ironically supports the capitalist structure by justifying women's market invisibility as
"choice." See Williams, supra note 55, at 819 (stating that cultural feminism thus
"enlist[s] women in their own oppression").
160. See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1675-76 (2004) (noting the feminist
view of the state as "the embodiment of institutionalized male power over women").
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may logically conclude that they must extend that same ethic of
care to criminal defendants."6  Yet it seems that when it comes to
how the state should deal with violent men, even cultural
feminists reject caring and cooperation. They do not universally
or even generally support continued intimacy with abusers or
mediation with accused date rapists."' Rather, reform of the
"male" justice system consists of strengthening rape and
domestic violence laws.'63 In this sense, cultural feminists adopt
the typical attitude when faced with what they believe is gross
misogyny-stamp it out through police power-and they turn
away their usual skeptical eyes from criminalization's costs to
women and society.
D. The Female Object-Agent Dichotomy
If deviant men are the agents of female subordination, it
seems that women must be the objects-they must perpetually
exist as innocent victims of male domination.'" It is true that
liberal, cultural, and dominance feminism tend to treat women as
innocent, that is, not complicit in their own subordination.6 1
Critics accordingly argue that second-wave feminism has failed
to provide a theoretical vehicle for scrutinizing women's own
contribution to female oppression or how certain classes of
women subordinate others.'6 6 However united in their view of
female innocence, second-wave feminist theories set forth
dichotomous views of women's subjectivity. This brings me to the
next orthodoxy-the characterization of women as pure agents
responsible for their life condition or alternatively as pure objects
incapable of exercising real choice in life.
161. Aviva Orenstein, "MY GOD!": A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 159, 196 (1997).
162. See HALLEY, supra note 14, at 29 (observing that in the 1980s, cultural
feminists centered on prosecution of rape and other direct violence against women as a
locus of activism); Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REv. 1, 3 (1998) (noting
cultural feminism's call for "lawmakers [to] thoroughly revise not only the rape
prohibition, but the liberal construct of autonomy itself"); West, supra note 29, at 59.
163. See West, supra note 29, at 59 (calling the under-prosecution of certain forms of
rape a consequence of masculinist jurisprudence and calling for adequate
criminalization). See generally West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 148, at 211-12 (2000)
(criticizing inadequate gender crime law as a product of society's failure to recognize how
women process pain).
164. See Harris, supra note 59, at 613 (maintaining that the "story of woman as
victim" denies complexity "to further the notion of an essential woman-she who is
victimized").
165. See Chamallas, supra note 26, 158-65 (discussing the goals and influence of
liberal, dominance, and cultural feminism to combat female subordination).
166. See HOOKS, supra note 2, at 67 (arguing that feminists have often dismissed the
problems of subordinated men).
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Starting with liberal feminism's view of women's agency,
liberalism, as a political theory, assumes that individuals are
agents capable of exercising free rational choice.' For the liberal
feminist, women are psychologically, socially, and culturally free
to make unconstrained choices about home and work life but are
often prevented from doing so by de jure barriers."' Without
those legal barriers, women would logically choose not to be
confined to a life of domesticity.'6 9
Cultural feminists object to liberal feminism's failure to
recognize female agency enough, while dominance feminists
argue that liberal feminism relies on female agency too much.
Cultural feminists reject the claim that women would not choose
to be caring, domestic, and intimate if given the free choice.' In
fact, some cultural feminists have gone so far as to call women's
domesticity a choice, notwithstanding the social and legal
pressures to stay at home."' For example, Robin West, while
recognizing that "neither motherhood nor intercourse have been
'released' from patriarchy," asserts that women "continue to
mother and to want to mother in spite of the compulsory nature
of institutional motherhood.""' This statement underscores the
agentizing goals of cultural feminism. It would perhaps be more
intuitive to claim that women mother because of and not in spite
of compulsory institutional motherhood. However, by
characterizing patriarchal pressures as something women would
normally resist, the fact that women want to mother within a
system that compels them to do so is not an indication that they
are objects of the patriarchal system, but rather evidence of
authentic choice.
By far contrast, dominance feminism indicts both liberal and
cultural feminism for refusing to recognize that women's choices
are perpetually conditioned by the patriarchy."' Choice is
therefore an illusion and cannot morally justify any given
167. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
168. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Red ux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 326 (1995) ("Liberalism, as applied in [second-wave
feminist] contexts, posited a subject whose humanity consisted in her theoretically
unlimited potential, and her capacity to exercise meaningful choice in the direction of her
own life.").
169. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
170. See Williams, supra note 55, at 801-03 (asserting that cultural feminists regard
women as freely choosing the domestic realm "and celebrate that choice as a badge of
virtue").
171. See id. at 819-20.
172. West, supra note 29, at 47-48.
173. See supra Part I.C.
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woman's life condition.'74  In the prescriptive hierarchy, then,
women's illusory choices must fall to the side when they conflict
with policies that dismantle male supremacy."'
In the end, both the characterization of women as pure
agents and the characterization of women as pure objects raise
serious issues. The description of women as unconstrained agents
who make autonomous life choices provides moral cover to those
who oppose legal and social reforms to alleviate the unfair
environment in which those choices occur."' As critics of
liberalism have long argued, the language of choice hides and
maintains status-quo oppression."' On the other hand, if
women's choices are considered meaningless, they can be
disregarded in pursuit of larger feminist goals. This makes
individual women sacrificial lambs in the quest to use the state
apparatus to fight patriarchy."' It may also have the effect of
transplanting one form of domination in the woman's life with
another, as we will see in the next Part."' Moreover, sacrificing
what women (perhaps self-deceptively) see as free choice to the
greater fight against the patriarchy may gain feminists very
little given that fighting against the patriarchy has been reduced
to outlawing "deviant" male behavior.8 o
174. See generally MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 85-105. For this reason,
MacKinnon prescribes "consciousness-raising" as her feminism's primary method, which
involves helping women see that their choices are never free. See id.
175. See Goodmark, supra note 19, at 4-5 ("Dominance feminism focuses on women's
subordinated and victimized status and argues that the legal system can best serve those
victims of violence by enforcing policies that ensure safety, regardless of what an
individual woman's preference might be.").
176. See Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1615 (1991) ("[Allthough liberal thought patterns encourage us
towards a dichotomy of absolute agency or absolute victimization, neither of these poles is
an accurate description of anybody. The point is not that women are passive victims of
ideology, but that calling their painful resolutions of work/family conflicts their 'choices'
deflects our attention away from the constraints within which they operate.").
177. See Williams, supra note 55, at 826 (asserting that the language of women's
choice is part of "an integrated system of power relations that systematically
disadvantages women"); Mark M. Hager, Sex in the Original Position: A Restatement of
Liberal Feminism, 14 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 181, 215 (1999).
178. See HALLEY, supra note 14, at 346 ("[Rlepresenting women as end points of
pain, imagining them as lacking the agency to cause harm to others and particularly to
harm men, feminists refuse also to see women--even injured ones-as powerful actors.");
Goodmark, supra note 19, at 43 (maintaining that dominance feminism regards women as
"incapable of making rational choices in the face of abuse and instead ... in need of the
substituted judgment of the legal system").
179. See Goodmark, supra note 19, at 43 n.254 (maintaining that the prosecutorial
route forces abuse victims "to rely on male-dominated, male-defined agencies to protect
them from male domination"); infra Part III.
180. See supra notes 149-153 and accompanying text. Indeed, such behavior is itself
often a product of the male perpetrator's oppressed condition. See HOOKS, supra note 2, at
NEOFEMINISM
Critical and post-modern feminists have suggested an
alternate vision, one in which women exercise rational choice in a
world that constrains them through sexism and other forms of
disempowerment.' The constrained agency theory proposes that
women often make life choices under conditions of great
constraint. However, the response should neither focus on
women's agency at the expense of attention to social inequality
nor ignore women's choices because they are imperfect. Rather,
feminists ought to fight actively against the constraints while
recognizing that choices made within them are meaningful and
should not be lightly cast aside.'
E. The Assault on Privacy
This brings us to the final second-wave orthodoxy-the assault
on privacy. Dominance feminism is clear in its condemnation of any
argument that shields unequal gender relationships and abusive
male behavior from government regulation under the umbrella of
privacy."' By contrast, liberalism embraces the public-private
distinction as one of its main tenets."' Nevertheless, because the
typical reaction to viewing morally condemnable behavior is the
desire for the government to intervene, even liberals have been
moved by dominance feminism's call to dismantle the public-
private distinction in the domestic violence context.' American
liberal legalism has long accepted the notion that privacy cannot
72-74 (asserting that a male of lower socioeconomic status may oppress women to
compensate for lack of social power); Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis:
Mechanisms of Mutual Support Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251,
291-300 (2002) (asserting that lower-status men may "subordinate others in order to
compensate for their own vulnerability and powerlessness").
181. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 168, at 376 (calling for "more sophisticated
accounts of liberal subjectivity or post-structuralist accounts of a decentered subject, who
unproblematically juxtaposes agency with constraint").
182. See id. at 351-52 (discussing how constraints have led to "a female subject
wholly incapable of self-direction").
183. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-
Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 838 (1999) (advocating "transformative agency"
whereby women "seek transformation through disruption of dominant discourses"); Gruber,
Feminist War, supra note 20, at 818-19 (noting that "domestic violence criminalization has
come at the cost of deflecting focus from economic empowerment"); Williams, supra note 176, at
1621, 1625-27, 1631-32 (advocating a series of socio-cultural and legal changes to address
gender equality without invoking the object-agent dichotomy).
184. See supra text accompanying note 88.
185. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
186. See Choudhury, supra note 19, at 260 n.1 ("Liberal feminism has diverged
[liberalism] in that it critiques the private sphere for oppressing women...."); Dixon, supra
note 117, at 302 (observing that liberal feminism "challengeld] the kind of stereotype that
equates harm to women as a matter of private ... concern"); Todd E. Pettys, Sodom's Shadow:
The Uncertain Line Between Public and Private Morality, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1161, 1211 (2009).
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immunize truly harmful behavior."' Indeed, selective impositions
on privacy have been a time-honored method of enforcing prevailing
notions of sexuality and interpersonal relations, even within our
privacy-protecting society. As we will see in the next two Parts,
liberals can argue that ignoring privacy in certain contexts is not a
violation of individual rights because society has a legitimate
interest in preventing and punishing outlying behavior.'
Responding to the dismantling of the public-private distinction in
the rape context, critics have noted that making various forms of
imperfect sex matters of public concern comes dangerously close to
morality policing.' In addition, scholars have recently begun to
focus on the intended and unintended negative consequences of
feminism opening the family home's door to police intervention.'
To recap, this Part has discussed several of the orthodoxies
that emerged from second-wave feminism and some of the critiques
of these orthodoxies. The orthodoxies include the idea that there is
an essential woman's experience, the embrace of absolutist concepts
of good and bad, the characterization of men (or a subset of deviant
men) as the exclusive source of women's subordination, the
utilization of prohibitive and criminal strategies rather than
distributive strategies, the treatment of women as pure agents or
objects, and the rejection of the public-private distinction. In the
next Part, we will see how these orthodoxies influenced law and
policy in the domestic violence arena.
IV. THE ANTI-DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MOVEMENT'S INCORPORATION
OF SECOND-WAVE ORTHODOXIES
Due in no small part to the efforts of second-wave and other
feminists, domestic violence criminal law has radically
transformed over the last thirty years.' Today, the state takes
187. See Robin West, Reconsidering Legalism, 88 MINN. L. REV. 119, 135 & n.60
(2003) ("Classical liberals, prominently John Stuart Mill, argued that the state should not
police private morality, but never argued against state policing of private violence.").
188. See generally Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law,
and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IowA L. REV. 1253, 1264 (2009) (asserting
that criminal law has always assisted family law in defining the normative boundaries of
family life).
189. See infra notes 210-214 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License:
Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 51, 93-94 (2002)
(arguing that concept of sexual privacy "implies an appropriate sexual modesty").
191. See generally Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2 (2006);
Murray, supra note 188, at 1265-67; infra notes 316-318 and accompanying text.
192. See Suk, supra note 191, at 5, 13 (discussing the criminalization of domestic
violence and noting that "all the states have enacted protection order legislation, which
they have amended and refined over the last thirty years").
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domestic violence "seriously." The law contains mechanisms to
boost prosecution and punishment of battering, and many
consider domestic violence law reform to be feminism's greatest
success.' It is, however, striking the extent to which theorizing
and policy making about domestic violence has and continues to
reflect and reinforce many of the orthodoxies discussed in the last
Part.
The initial feminist efforts regarding domestic violence had a
distinct welfarist bent, as women's groups came together and
lobbied local, state, and federal governments for resources for
battered women."' Experts note that the early battered women's
movement did not take an insular view of abuse as something
individual deviant men do to weak women but rather saw
domestic violence as facilitated and maintained by a patriarchal
society.' Early reformers regarded battering as assisted by
"[slocial supports ... includling] widespread denial of its
frequency or harm, economic structures that render women
vulnerable, and sexist ideology that holds women accountable for
male violence and for the emotional lives of families, and that
fosters deference to male familial control." 96
Beginning in the 1980s, reformers aggressively pursued
criminalization as the primary solution to battering.,9 . Like many
193. See, e.g., Adele M. Morrison, Queering Domestic Violence to "Straighten Out"
Criminal Law: What Might Happen When Queer Theory and Practice Meet Criminal
Law's Conventional Responses to Domestic Violence, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
81, 93 (2003) (noting feminists' success in "enlist[ing] the law in the fight against domestic
violence"); Murray, supra note 188, at 1263 (calling the domestic violence reform project
"remarkably successful"); Paula Finley Mangum, Note, Reconceptualizing Battered
Woman Syndrome Evidence: Prosecution Use of Expert Testimony on Battering, 19 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 593, 593, 597-98 (1999) (asserting that domestic violence
criminalization "is one of the great achievements of feminism").
194. See Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 748-49 (observing that early
reforms involved "address ing] the economic and social realities that kept women in
abusive relationships or led them to remain silent about rape"); Sack, supra note 160, at
1666 (describing the early battered women's movement as a "grassroots effort to provide
services and shelter to domestic violence victims, independent of state involvement").
195. See MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 5 ("The development of [the] battered
women's movement . . . has now moved from social invisibility as a 'private problem' to an
important public concern."); ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BAT'TERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST
LAWMAKING 182 (2000) ("Many [early] feminists saw battering as the product of
patriarchy, as male control over women.").
196. Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo
Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 39 (1999); see Miccio, supra note 19, at 249 ("The
battered women's movement developed an ideology that contested the appropriation of
women's bodies, challenged conceptions of male supremacy in the family, and analyzed
how the individual power of the patriarch was supported and legitimized by the state.").
197. Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence of Criminology on Criminal Law:
Evaluating Arrests for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 9
(1992); see also Marion Wanless, Note, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating
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other reformers, feminists turned to the criminal law in the
hopes of immediately deterring abuse and creating new social
attitudes and norms.' Of course, scholars have noted for years
that the link between law reform and social norms is plainly
nonlinear and existing norms tend to be "sticky."" Nevertheless,
in the domestic violence arena, the attitude towards abuse has
seemed to change over the past few decades, perhaps due in part
to increased prosecution.2 00 Abuse is clearly not considered
legitimate or even private.' Yet society still tends to divorce
domestic abuse from the larger social context by viewing it as
something only evil criminals do to their weak wives.2 2
While it may be somewhat intuitive to consider criminal
prohibition the fastest path to social reform, feminists' choice to
engage with the state was still a curious one.03 Male actors in the
criminal justice system had always "protected their own"; would
they really be willing to adopt a feminist agenda?o'
Domestic Violence, But Is It Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 537 (1996) (noting that
during the 1980s "increasing pressure from battered women's advocates forced most
states" to reform their criminal laws to combat domestic violence).
198. See Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest of Batterers: A Reply to Its Critics, in Do
ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 115, 129 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa
eds., 1996) (asserting that even if they do not deter, mandatory policies serve the "indirect
function of setting a standard of zero tolerance for battering that other institutions can
emulate"); Sack, supra note 160, at 1666 (noting the call for increasingly aggressive police
intervention and prosecution).
199. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 610 (2000) (noting that as social norms grown in
strength, "the resistance of decisionmakers [to enforce laws that alter those norms] will
grow too"); see also Betsy Tsai, Note, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence
Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1325 (2000)
(expressing doubt that criminal law, in the absence of far-reaching social reforms, could
change deeply held attitudes that predicate domestic violence).
200. See Emily J. Sack, From the Right of Chastisement to the Criminalization of
Domestic Violence: A Study in Resistance to Effective Policy Reform, 32 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 31, 37 (2009) ("The attitudes as well as the policies of law enforcement, prosecution,
and judges have changed dramatically in the past 25 years, reflecting far greater
understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence."); Wanless, supra note 197, at 543
("In response to the unabated epidemic of domestic violence and other forms of violence
against women, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act ... [which] provides a
significant economic incentive for states to enact mandatory arrest laws.").
201. See infra notes 254-256 and accompanying text.
202. Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 817 ("[Tlhe focus on criminalization
entrenches the view that batterers are wholly autonomous agents who bear sole
responsibility for domestic violence."); Melanie Randall, Domestic Violence and the
Construction of "Ideal Victims": Assaulted Women's "Image Problems" in Law, 23 ST.
Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 107, 112 (2004) (discussing the view that "men who perpetrate
violence against women are deviant individuals with an unhealthy need for power and
control").
203. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
204. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 195, at 182 (observing that skeptical feminists "saw
the state as maintaining, enforcing, and legitimizing male violence against women");
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Unfortunately, the criminal justice system did not adopt a
feminist agenda; feminists adopted the criminal justice system's
agenda.
Once reformers embarked on the criminal route they
initially pursued a liberal strategy of calling for formal equality
in prosecutions. Activists emphasized that an assault on a
woman is as bad as (or worse than) any other assault and state
actors and jurors should therefore take it equally seriously.2 0
However, prosecution of domestic abuse also meant state
intervention into family relationships.2 "' Dominance feminists
had always regarded the private realm as a space of male
domination.207 Cultural feminists view the domestic sphere as
important and undervalued but agree that privacy could be
sacrificed in truly egregious instances of male violence.20
However, the sacrifice of relationship privacy in the domestic
violence context was largely accepted, if not created, by
proponents of liberalism, including antigovernment
*209conservatives.
Even those committed to political liberalism accommodate
criminal law interventions into relationship privacy in the name
of the larger public good.2"0 In the 1980s, conservatives could take
domestic violence seriously without offending their commitment
to liberal individualism and privacy by characterizing domestic
violence as a public problem.' Then-Surgeon General C. Everett
Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of Criminalization, 49
DEPAUL L. REV. 817, 821 (2000) (critiquing the "criminal route" for giving "control to the
state," providing "little support" to women, and being "nonneutral").
205. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 195, at 186 (asserting that mandatory prosecution
policies "send a message that domestic violence shall not be treated as a less serious crime
than violence between strangers"); Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 752
("[L]iberal feminists called for the formal equality of genders, requiring, at the very least,
that criminal laws treat men and women equally.").
206. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 195, at 5 (noting that the battered women's
movement moved the battering issue "from social invisibility as a 'private problem' to an
important public concern").
207. See supra notes 126-132 and accompanying text.
208. See Dixon, supra note 117, at 302-03 (arguing that cultural feminists would
support legislation that "attempt[s] to combat sexual and domestic violence"); supra notes
72, 163 and accompanying text.
209. See Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 763-64 (asserting that "socially
conservative tough-on-crime ideology" was "a subset of a more general libertarian shift
toward individual responsibility and away from social welfare").
210. See Murray, supra note 188, at 1269 (observing criminal law's history of
"elaborating the normative content of married life" by, for example, criminalizing sodomy
to "underscore[ I marriage's heterosexual character" and criminalizing prostitution to
"reinforce[] the understanding of marriage as involving non-commercial, private sex").
211. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. HART ET AL., U.S. ATry GEN.'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY
VIOLENCE, FINAL REP. 30 (1984) (asserting that "the prosecutor, on behalf of the state,
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Koop described domestic violence as a public health problem that
entailed significant healthcare costs.' John Ashcroft, heading
President Reagan's task force on domestic violence, identified the
harm of domestic violence as the abuser and victim both
instilling improper family values in their children.1 Fast
forward to modem times and not only is domestic violence a
public problem, but also households with suspected violence are
subject to regulation in almost every conceivable way."
Without the privacy hurdle, liberal reformers were free to
call on state actors to vigorously intervene in abusive
relationships. However, a purely liberal strategy had other
problems. Abuse victims could not pursue their "rights" and
receive equal treatment in criminal court given the prevailing
cultural environment. Put simply, state actors and jurors were
not willing to take domestic violence seriously, despite the
mandate of law."' This made it eminently clear that domestic
violence was not simply a failure of formal equality-it was a
and not the victim" should control the destiny of domestic violence cases); see also Toni L.
Harvey, Student Work, Batterers Beware: West Virginia Responds to Domestic Violence
with the Probable Cause Warrantless Arrest Statute, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 181, 205 (1994)
(asserting that tough criminalization policies "ensure that domestic violence will be
perceived and treated as a crime against 'society as a whole'"); Wanless, supra note 197,
at 567 (arguing that domestic violence is a crime against society).
212. See Mary S. Hood & Julie Kunce Field, Domestic Abuse Injunction Law and
Practice: Will Michigan Ever Catch Up to the Rest of the Country?, 73 MICH. B.J. 902, 902
n.1 (1994) ("In 1985, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop told health professionals that
domestic violence was a 'public health menace."'); Jan Hoffman, When Men Hit Women,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 16, 1992, § 6 at 25 (explaining that C. Everett Koop, the former
Surgeon General, "has identified domestic violence as the No. 1 health problem for
American women, causing more injuries than automobile accidents, muggings and rapes
combined").
213. See HART ET AL., supra note 211, at 118-19 (characterizing domestic violence
criminalization as "public policy [that] support[s] and strengthen[s] family values"); see
also Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft: Annual Symposium on
Domestic Violence (Oct. 29, 2002), DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/archive/ovw/
docs/agremarks.htm (asserting that "when families are wracked by violence and abuse,
[family] values are corrupted").
214. See infra text accompanying note 317; see also Donna Coker, Shifting Power for
Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1009, 1047-48 (2000) (noting that women may be reported for child abuse and other
crimes when police respond to domestic violence calls).
215. See Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 757 ("[Plolice, prosecutors, judges,
and jurors, internalizing patriarchal attitudes, simply did not treat victims of domestic
violence the same way as other crime victims."); Nichole Miras Mordini, Note, Mandatory
State Interventions for Domestic Abuse Cases: An Examination of the Effects on Victim
Safety and Autonomy, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 295, 312 (2004) (discussing some officers'
reluctance to promptly respond to domestic violence calls and hesitancy to make arrests
once upon the scene); Christine O'Connor, Note, Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and
the Autonomy Rights of Victims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 937, 942-43 (1999) (attributing
prosecutor reluctance to the belief that domestic violence is a private problem as well as
victim reluctance); Sherman, supra note 197, at 12-13.
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matter of the prevalence of patriarchy within the criminal justice
system and society at large.216
There was an array of strategies reformers could have enlisted
to fight the influence of patriarchy in domestic violence cases. They
could pursue a distributive strategy of giving economic and social
support to those women most vulnerable to violence to empower
them to break the cycle of abuse." Reformers could also intervene
through education programs directed toward likely abusers, police,
judges, and others. In fact, this has been done,"' but not without
controversy."' However, the most visible and prolific reforms geared
toward addressing patriarchal attitudes have a distinctly
dominance feminism bent. To fight the influence of de facto sexism,
reformers turned to mandatory arrest and prosecution policies,220 a
well as other trial reforms that increase convictions (for example,
specialized courts,22 ' exceptional evidentiary rules,' and unique
plea bargaining processes 2 ).
216. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing patriarchy and the law).
217. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
218. For example, the Violence Against Women Act provides funding for training about
"sex stereotyping of female and male victims of domestic violence and dating violence." 42
U.S.C. § 13992(13) (2006); see also Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence
Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 3, 44 (1999) (noting that judges assigned to the District of Columbia domestic
violence court are "required to undergo formal training on intimate abuse").
219. See Mary Becker, Keynote Address, Domestic Violence and Victimizing the Victim:
Relief Results, Reform, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 477, 487-88 (2003) (cautioning that domestic
violence "[elducation is not necessarily effective and can reinforce stereotypes and actually do
harm"); Epstein, supra note 218, at 45-46 (noting that judicial training may create the
appearance of antidefense bias).
220. Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 757; see Micchio, supra note 19, at 239, 239
n.2 (discussing prevalence of mandatory policies and citing statutes); O'Connor, supra note
215, at 943-47; see also, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530 (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(cXl)
(West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6(1) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(a)
(West Supp. 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.2901(2) (West 2010) ("The state attorney in each
circuit shall adopt a pro-prosecution policy for acts of domestic violence. . ."); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 611A.0311 subd. 2(4) (West 2009) (mandating "procedures to encourage the prosecution
of all domestic abuse cases where a crime can be proven"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.31.100(2)(c) (West Supp. 2012).
221. See Epstein, supra note 218, at 32-34 (discussing the Washington, D.C. Domestic
Violence Court); Anat Maytal, Note, Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Are They Worth the
Trouble in Massachusetts?, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 197, 213-21 (2008) (discussing specialized
domestic violence courts in Massachusetts).
222. See Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against
Women, 36 IND. L. REv. 687, 708-16 (2003) (discussing whether state exceptions to hearsay
rules in domestic violence cases should be incorporated into the Federal Rules of Evidence);
Eleanor Simon, Confrontation and Domestic Violence Post-Davis: Is There and Should There
Be a Doctrinal Exception?, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 175, 185-97 (2011) (analyzing whether
courts create de facto exceptions to hearsay rules in domestic violence cases).
223. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-801(3) (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-
2.7(6) (LexisNexis 2008) ("The court may not approve diversion for a perpetrator of
domestic violence.").
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Feminists anticipated state actor backlash against
mandatory arrest and no-drop policies due to the prevalence of
sexist attitudes within policing circles and prosecutorial
skepticism regarding success rates.2  However, the
implementation of mandatory policies exposed the extent to
which victims themselves resisted participating in criminal
proceedings.225 Many women who initially reported domestic
abuse did not want their partners to be arrested, prosecuted, or
convicted.' In turn, prosecutors proceeded against these
women's wills and even in their absence.22 7 One might think that
women's choices not to participate in the domestic violence
criminalization project would have thrown reformers into a moral
crisis, but generally it did not.228 For dominance feminists,
women's actual choices should be subordinate to reforms that
challenge the patriarchy because such choices are inauthentic,
products of subordination, and therefore relatively
meaningless.' However, liberal feminism, like liberalism in
general, regards honoring individual choice as integral to a just
224. See Naomi R. Cahn, Innovative Approaches to the Prosecution of Domestic
Violence Crimes: An Overview, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE 161, 163 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992) (noting that district
attorneys believe that uncooperative battered women "waste precious prosecutorial
resources"); Linda L. Ammons, Discretionary Justice: A Legal and Policy Analysis of a
Governor's Use of the Clemency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women, 3 J.L.
& POL'Y 1, 69 (1994).
225. See Coker, supra note 214, at 1047-48 (describing victims' reluctance to
participate in the criminal domestic violence process); Gruber, Feminist War, supra note
20, at 761 ("[Albused women themselves were reluctant to participate in state
intervention.").
226. See Coker, supra note 214, at 1017-19 (discussing reasons why some women
prefer to stay with their batterers); Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 761
(observing that abused women "desired that the system exempt their partners from
enforcement").
227. See Morrison, supra note 193, at 93 ("Once efforts to enlist the law in the fight
against domestic violence became successful, I argue that the law essentially took over
anti-domestic violence efforts."); Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 761-63
(discussing the movement toward prosecutorial intervention in domestic violence, despite
victims' wishes).
228. I say "generally" because in fact many feminists in the battered women's
movement were highly skeptical of the turn toward criminal law. See, eg., Coker, supra
note 19, at 806-07 (noting some potential benefits of mandatory policies, but concluding
that they do not strike a good balance between reducing harm and state power);
Maguigan, supra note 19, at 443-44 (advocating a moratorium on mandatory arrest and
prosecution laws); Sally Merry, Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking: Author Meets
Readers, Elizabeth M. Schneider, Christine Harrington, Sally Engle Merry, Rende
Romkens, & Marianne Wesson, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 313, 332 (2002) (expressing concern that
the domestic violence reform succeeded because it "dovetailed with [crime control]
agendas, both the refocus on victims and the increase of control and surveillance over men
of color").
229. See supra Part II.C.
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society."'o How could liberal feminism accept a system that forces
reluctant women to be witnesses, sometimes under the threat of
criminal penalties?
Just as liberalism makes a general exception for
authoritarian criminal policies, liberal feminists have found ways
to exempt mandatory domestic violence policies from their usual
skepticism regarding restrictions on autonomy. Some reformers
justify discounting victims' choices by emphasizing the nature of
domestic abuse as a crime against society.m In this view, abused
women have no more right to refuse to testify than other crime
witnesses."' This argument is unsatisfying from a feminist
perspective because it relegates domestic violence reform to a
matter of crime control rather than women's empowerment.
Activists, however, had another argument for discounting the
desires of nonprosecutorial abuse victims, which ultimately
proved to be persuasive to liberals.
Liberalism rests on the presumption that free choice is
possible and downplays social, economic, and cultural conditions
that limit certain individuals' choices and renders other choices
imperfect .2  However, even within the liberal model, there are
some conditions that prevent or negate choice. In the liberal
model, choices conditioned by direct threats or coercive behavior
are not binding.23 6 It is no wonder, then, that the most common
230. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in
Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1891 (1996) (advocating treating
abused women like other reluctant witnesses, including witnesses in cases involving
"organized crime, [and] gang- and drug-related offenses"); Donna Wills, Domestic
Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 173, 180 (1997) ("By
proceeding with the prosecution with or without victim cooperation, the prosecutor
minimizes the victim's value to the batterer as an ally to defeat criminal prosecution.").
233. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 195, at 183 ("[Fleminist liberatory discourse
challenging patriarchy and female dependency, which shaped [domestic violence] work,
has been replaced by discourse emphasizing crime control."); Deborah Epstein, Margaret
E. Bell & Lisa A. Goodman, Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing
Victims' Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. U. J.
GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 465, 466-67 (2003) (observing that no drop policies are consistent
with prosecutorial goals and "the potential impact of the prosecution on the victim is not
considered particularly relevant").
234. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
235. De jure limitations are an obvious category. See supra notes 37-38 and
accompanying text (discussing liberal feminists' calls to dismantle de jure barriers to
women in the workplace).
236. See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law & Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J.
472, 475-77 (1980) (noting that the libertarian theory of contract allows for rescission
only when a third party's right are violated or the agreement was coerced); Mack & Gaus,
supra note 257, at 115.
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argument for divesting abuse victims of power over the criminal
case is that abused women are coercively controlled by their
abusers; thus, allowing them to exercise choice operatively
permits the abuser to manipulate the criminal trial.m
When one makes a choice under duress, the general liberal
response is to allow rescission of that choice"' or refrain from
holding the individual accountable for that choice.239 In no-drop
domestic violence jurisdictions, however, when a woman decides
she does not want to prosecute, in the best case, her choice is
ignored as an a priori matter.4 o In the worst case, her choice is
held against her, and in an effort to make her change her mind,
the state uses its own coercive powers to counter the assumed
duress she has been placed under by her partner.
To maintain the duress argument, reformers and
prosecutors have had to publicize an essentialist and objectifying
view of abused women's life conditions and even psychology. They
characterize battered women as "innocent": They play no willful
part in the violence or maintenance of the relationship, and any
reluctance to prosecute originates from the abuser's direct
threats.' This paradigmatic image of a battered woman, which
237. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 232, at 1891 ("When a batterer and his defense
attorney know that a victim's failure to cooperate may result in case dismissal, they
control the judicial process."); Machaela M. Hoctor, Comment, Domestic Violence as a
Crime Against the State: The Need for Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 CALIF. L. REV.
643, 687 (1997) ("Because batterers have such overwhelming control over their victims,
and the system required victims to control the prosecution, batterers, in effect, were being
given control over the disposition of their own criminal case.").
238. See Mack & Gaus, supra note 257, at 115; supra note 236 and accompanying
text (discussing duress in liberal contract theory).
239. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1985) ("It is an affirmative defense that the
actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to
do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of
another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to
resist."); Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1339 (1997).
240. See Wills, supra note 232, at 180 ("A 'no drop' policy means prosecutors will not
allow batterers to control the system ofjustice through their victims.").
241. See Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging
the Case but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 191, 203
("[Prosecutors may subpoena [domestic violence] victims and sometimes may
incarcerate them to compel their testimony."); Jeanine Percival, Note, The Price of
Silence: The Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases in Light of Crawford v.
Washington, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 213, 241 (2005) ("[S]ome prosecutors threaten to: take
the victim's children away; prosecute the victim for child endangerment, neglect, or
disturbing the peace; drop the case entirely; or not prosecute future domestic violence
incidences .... In the most extreme cases, prosecutors threaten to or do, in fact, jail
the victim . . .").
242. See Randall, supra note 202, at 144-45 (observing that cooperative victims
are seen as "true victims" whereas "the 'uncooperative victim' is entirely helpless and
fails to appear or refuses to testify about the abuse because she is paralyzed by
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propelled forward procriminalization reforms, has been
publicized in a racially specific manner. Farrah Fawcett in The
Burning Bed and Nicole Brown Simpson were the early icons of
domestic violence reform-white, beautiful, innocent, nonpoor,
devoted mothers, who had been subjected to horrific violence, had
made past efforts to separate from their abusers, and could have
been saved by tougher prosecution." In the absence of evidence
of direct threats, the discourse moves toward the psychological
state of the abused woman. Characterizing battered women as
psychologically damaged and problematically dependent makes it
easy to dismiss any choice not to prosecute.'" Battered women
have become, by definition, incapable of exercising agency.
There is another way in which reformers have maintained
the claim that agency-denying domestic violence laws are not
illiberal. Supporters contend that mandatory prosecution
actually renders victims free to exercise their true preference,
which is of course to leave the abuser. The idea is that by
removing the only constraint on women's ability to prosecute (the
coercive actions of batterers), women are able to pursue what
they really desire-jailing the man and getting out of the
relationship.2" Domestic violence activists portray victims' actual
fear"); see also Wills, supra note 232, at 177 (asserting that the "great majority" of
domestic violence victims "have neither the will nor the courage to assist
prosecutors").
243. See Laurie L. Levenson, Stereotypes of Women in the O.J. Simpson Case (Dec.
7, 1994), Doc. No. 681370 (Westlaw O.J. Simpson Case Commentaries Database) ("The
name Nicole Brown Simpson has now become synonymous with the image of the battered
wife-a young, beautiful woman, unable to escape her abuser, and unable to get the
criminal justice system to respond to her pleas."); see also Mahoney, supra note 153, at 2-
4 (asserting that the movie The Burning Bed created a cultural image of the battered
woman as an ultimately innocent, meek creature subjected to terrorism-like violence); ef
Cheryl I. Harris, Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of O.J. Simpson and Susan
Smith-Spectacles of Our Times, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 225, 230 (1996) (arguing that racial
and sexual imagery in the media can "undermine our ability to accurately perceive how
hierarchical relations of dominance and subordination have marked our history and our
present and threaten our future").
244. See O'Connor, supra note 215, at 960 (noting the "commonly held notion of
battered women as weak, passive or even pathological for staying with abusive men");
Randall, supra note 202, at 123-24 (discussing how the "battered woman syndrome"
conjures images of helpless, damaged, and dysfunctional women who are "incapable of
autonomy or rationality in their actions"). Some reformers advocate outright
guardianship for abused women. See, e.g., Dana Harrington Conner, To Protect or to
Serve: Confidentiality, Client Protection, and Domestic Violence, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 877,
930-31 (2006); Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered Women:
Breaking the Control of the Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605, 612 (2000) ("Guardianship is a legal
remedy that should be used when a battered woman is coercively controlled and cannot
protect herself.").
245. See Wills, supra note 232, at 180 ("Supporters of 'no drop' domestic violence
policies realize that empowering victims by giving them the discretion to prosecute .. . in
actuality only empowers batterers to further manipulate and endanger their victims'
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decisions not to prosecute as coerced while characterizing forced
prosecution as freeing victims to make authentic choices.246 This
way, they can argue that diminishing the power of victims who
are reluctant to prosecute is really a form of liberation.
As victims, the state divests abuse survivors of agency. But
prosecutors have no problem treating those same survivors as
agents when they have the misfortune of becoming defendants.
Prosecutors hold battering victims unconditionally responsible
for acts of child abuse and neglect," even those premised on
failing to intervene. 2 48 The presumption that battered women are
perpetually coerced to remain in the relationship, which
prosecutors use to disempower nonprosecutorial victims,
suddenly evaporates when battered women are charged with
murdering their husbands. In such cases, the state routinely
maintains that battered women are free agents, capable of
leaving their abusive situations and seeking redress through
nonviolent and official means."
In responding to the contention that battered women who
kill are pure agents, reformers could have emphasized the
myriad of factors, from direct physical threats to lack of
resources, which render the choice to kill rather than leave
necessary and reasonable.2 50 However, for strategic reasons
related to the patriarchal nature of the legal system, reformers
lives . . . ."); Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 813-14 (noting the domestic violence
movement's assumption that victims are too scared to pursue the prosecutorial route they
really desire).
246. By the same token, it freed conservatives to blame women who stayed with
abusers for failing to take advantage of the ample prosecutorial opportunities. See Elaine
Chiu, Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 1223, 1258 (2001)
(contending that conservatives "believe it is justified to penalize battered women anytime
they do not use their opportunities and control to end the abuse"); Deborah M. Weissman,
Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between "The Truly National and the Truly
Local," 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1133 (2001) ("[A]ttention to criminal remedies actually
contributes to skepticism that battered women continue to face difficulties in the courts.").
247. See Coker, supra note 214, at 1047-48 ("An investigation into domestic violence
may result in the victim losing her children or in her own incarceration or both.").
248. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of
Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 553 (1992)
("[B]attered mothers whose children are abused by their batterers have been prosecuted
for child abuse or neglect, and even for manslaughter, on the theory that they have failed
to protect the child from the batterer.").
249. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PI'r. L, REV. 477,
498-99 (1996) (observing that battered women who kill may be treated as agents rather
than victims).
250. But see Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and
Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 449 (1991)
(advocating as an alternative to the battered woman syndrome defense a self-defense law




elected to characterize such battered women as objects of an
aberrant psychological syndrome that prevented them from
leaving."' In the end, the criminal system's treatment of battered
women flips unsatisfyingly between ignoring and punishing
battered women's choices, and as Elaine Chiu notes,
[Tihe only consistency in the present system is that
battered women always end up with the short end of the
stick: either being denied a voice by the system that is
supposedly acting in their best interest or being blamed for
abuse that they cannot completely control when the
consequences of such abuse are extreme . . .'.
Consequently, in reform discourse, victims of domestic abuse
are routinely described as objects of terrifying violence or mental
conditions caused by such violence.25 3 Batterers occupy the role of
empowered, evil manipulators who continually perpetrate
violence.' These characterizations helped cement the popular
mindset that batterers are aberrant losers with whom no woman
in her right mind would stay' This discourse has the effect of
creating a bright line between battering and other forms of
dominating male behavior. Batterers engage in extreme brutality
and are unlike "ordinary" men, who are permitted to be sexist or
nonviolently controlling and still fall under the umbrella of
"normal."25 6 Batterers thus constitute an exceptional minority
among men, who do not represent prevailing cultural attitudes.
Feminists' embrace of harsh criminal policies and
employment of a dialectic involving innocent victims and
monstrous defendants mirrored the general trajectory of criminal
251. See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994) (asserting
that the battered woman syndrome defense "denies that women have the same capacity
for self-governance that is attributed to men").
252. Chiu, supra note 246, at 1225.
253. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
254. See Naomi Cahn & Joan Meier, Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence:
Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 339, 344 (1995) (noting the [i naccurate
images of abusers as 'out of control' monsters"). The legal literature on domestic violence
is rife with narratives depicting horrific crimes committed by monstrous men. See Gruber,
Feminist War, supra note 20, at 746 n.15 (observing "the multitude of scholarly articles on
domestic violence that draw in the reader by beginning with graphic descriptions of the
worst cases of abuse"); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 35 (1991).
255. See Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 808 (noting that people "uniformly
look upon 'wife beaters' with hatred and disdain"); cf Mahoney, supra note 153, at 11
(asserting that judicial opinions treat domestic violence as "aberrant and unusual").
256. One study reveals that men define domestic violence specifically in terms of
physical abuse and are less likely to see other forms of control as illegitimate. Men and
Women Define Domestic Violence Differently, PLANETPSYCH.COM,
http://www.planetpsych.com/zPsychology-101/domestic-violence.htm (last visited Mar. 23,
2013).
2013] 1369
1370 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [50:5
law at the time. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the United
States was in the throes of a tough-on-crime wave in which
concepts like rehabilitation and forgiveness gave way to
retribution and righteous indignation.2 57 In the crime control
moral equation, nuanced considerations of defendants' economic
conditions, social circumstances, and experiences of
discrimination yielded to reductionist dichotomies of good and
evil, right and wrong.' This feminist-crime control convergence
created some very strange bedfellows, as powerful conservative
men with abysmal track records on women's issues adopted
domestic violence activists' agenda and vocally extolled the
virtues of getting tough on batterers.25 9 John Ashcroft advocated
strict anti-domestic violence laws and characterized pursuing
prosecution as the woman's duty to her children."o George W.
Bush ensured the public that the "government is engaged in the
fight" against domestic violence through prosecutors who are
257. See generally Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 763-68; supra notes 297-
323 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of tough-on-crime ideology). Tough-on-
crime ideology is most readily associated with President Ronald Reagan, who stated:
Individual wrongdoing, (liberals] told us, was always caused by a lack of
material goods, and underprivileged background, or poor socioeconomic
conditions. And somehow . .. it was society, not the individual, that was at fault
when an act of violence or a crime was committed. Somehow, it wasn't the
wrongdoer but all of us who were to blame.
Is it any wonder, then, that a new privileged class emerged in America, a class of
repeat offenders and career criminals who thought they had the right to
victimize their fellow citizens with impunity.
Ronald W. Reagan, Remarks at the Annual Conference of the National Sheriffs
Association in Hartford, Connecticut (June 20, 1984), THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF PRESIDENT
RONALD W. REAGAN, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/62084c.htm;
see also G.O.P. Testimony on Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1968, at 20 (quoting then-
governor Reagan as stating: "It is time to restore the American precept that each
individual is accountable for his actions.").
258. See Otis B. Grant, Rational Choice or Wrongful Discrimination? The Law and
Economics of Jury Nullification, 14 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 145, 151-52 (2004)
(describing the conservative "free will" ideology that asserts criminals make rational
choices and that African Americans choose to promote a subculture of lawlessness); see
also David A. Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming the Conservative Legal Agenda,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 2032, 2074 (2004) (asserting that modern conservatives justify harsh
criminal policies by advancing a binary view of morality in which there are inherently
good or bad people).
259. See Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of
Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1505, 1514-15 (1998) (noting the convergence
of feminist and social conservatives on the domestic violence criminalization issue).
260. He stated:
One victim of domestic abuse who found help described this transformation [of
family values] better than I ever could. She said, quote, "I finally realized the
truth, that I was hurting not only myself, but I was hurting my children even
more. I was teaching them by example that they deserved to be abused and that
violence was acceptable."
Prepared Remarks ofAttorney General John Ashcroft, supra note 213.
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"finding the abusers, and ... throwing the book at them.""' The
world had been officially divided into two categories: autonomous
abusive men (and their sexist sympathizers) and everyone else
(who, of course, believed that such men should be spared no
mercy by the criminal system). Today, resources continue to be
poured into jailing (disproportionately minority)... men for
battering, and the anti-abuse movement seems far removed from
its progressive feminist roots.6
Consequently, the story of domestic violence reform
illustrates the operation of the problematic feminist orthodoxies
in positive law. The push toward criminalization, especially
mandatory criminal intervention, reflected and was assisted by
an essentialist view of domestic violence victims, their life
circumstances, and their true desires. Domestic violence reform
rhetoric also adopted absolutist and de-contextualized views of
good and evil. Moreover, reformers unconditionally embraced
the notion that privacy could only be a bad thing in abused
women's lives. The reform movement also failed to adopt a
nuanced approach to female agency, vacillating between
viewing abused women as complete objects of batterers or
defective psychology and, alternatively, as complete agents
responsible for their poor choices. Finally, deploying essentialist
characteristics of both abuse victims and abusers, activists
successfully argued for tougher criminal laws in an era when
criminalization was problematically elevated to the only
acceptable form of governing.
261. President George W. Bush, Bush Proclaims October Domestic Violence Awareness
Month, Remarks by the President on Domestic Violence Prevention (Oct. 8, 2003),
http//georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/200310/
20031008-5.html.
262. See Coker, supra note 214, at 1034-35 & n.104 (stating that "disproportionate
numbers of African American and somewhat lower but still disproportionately high numbers of
Latinastos are the subject of criminal justice intervention in domestic violence cases" and citing
studies); see also LINDA G. MILLs, INSULT To INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE
ABUSE 31 (2003) (noting the disproportionate rate of prosecution of men of color for intimate
abuse crimes).
263. See MS. FOUND. FOR WOMEN, SAFETY & JUSTICE FOR ALL: EXAMINING THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WOMEN's ANTI-VIOLENCE MOVEMENT AND THE CRIMINAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 6 (2003), available at http/files.praxisinternational.org/safety-justice.pdf (noting the
concern that the modern anti-abuse movement relies too heavily on the criminal legal system).
According to the report:
To achieve a better response from law enforcement, which has traditionally been
unresponsive to violence against women, the movement has devoted considerable
energy to legal reform and to getting the legal-judicial systems to take the problem
seriously. This has led to an over-emphasis on, or "over-resourcing" of, the legal system




V. NEOFEMINIST ANALYSES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW
REFORM
In recent years, feminist legal scholars have questioned
many of the philosophical, discursive, and doctrinal moves of
domestic violence law reform. This body of scholarship also
analyzes many second-wave orthodoxies in the domestic
violence context. One of the most critiqued aspects of the anti-
domestic violence movement is its adoption and reification of
essentialist characterizations of abused women (and abusers).
The discourse justifying harsh domestic violence policies,
particularly mandatory policies, situates battered women in a
particular way. Again, reform has emphasized innocent,
passive abused women who want to use the criminal system
for retribution and to separate from their partners but are
thwarted by their abusers' threats (or a dependent personality)
and an unresponsive penal system.26 4 Batterers are
empowered, culpable, and evil, and they can only be deterred
by harsh sanctions (which they also deserve).265
These reductionist descriptions are the subject of much
criticism, including a powerful racial critique. In addition to
the overtly racialized narratives of battered women, including
those discussed earlier,2 66 the paradigmatic abused woman's
inherent characteristics carry racial meaning. One
commentator notes that "[t]he dominant images of Black
women as domineering, assertive, hostile, and immoral may
hinder a judge's or juror's ability to comprehend a Black
woman's act of self-defense as based on 'learned
helplessness."" Domestic violence reform discourse fails to
account for, and even capitalizes on, extant racial stereotypes.
In doing so, it renders invisible minority victims who society
does not regard as passive and weak. Linda Ammons discusses
the case of Pamela Hill, an abused African-American woman
who killed her partner during a struggle.6 The prosecutor in
264. See supra notes 242-246 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 254-256 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 243 and accompanying text; cf Coker, supra note 214, at 1028-29
("Research purportedly about 'battered women' or 'domestic violence' frequently rests on data
gathered only or mainly about white women.").
267. Sharon Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist
Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 204 (1991).
268. Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and
Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 Wis. L.
REV. 1003, 1006-07 (1995).
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Hill's case stated in closing argument that Hill was not
"carrying the banner of Nicole Simpson.""' Ammons notes:
The imagery and stereotypes that were raised by the
prosecutor's comparison of Pamela Hill and Nicole
Simpson cannot be missed. Nicole Simpson was white,
beautiful, rich, portrayed as a good mother, and
brutalized. Pamela Hill is black, poor, an unwed mother,
and considered violent. Hill was convicted and received a
sentence of five to twenty-five years. The prosecutor, in
making the statement about Pamela Hill "carrying the
banner of Nicole Simpson," wanted to make sure that the
jurors had a picture in their minds of a real battered
270woman.
The unfortunate result of this discourse is that black abuse
victims are less likely to get relief from the criminal justice
system and more likely to be arrested under mandatory arrest
statutes as "mutual combatants."2 7 1
Moreover, amplified prosecution efforts tend to disparately
impact black and Latino men. While there are stereotypes of
batterers that run the racial gamut from Chicano gang member
to white banker, like most tough-on-crime reforms, the burdens
of harsher domestic violence laws have fallen most heavily on
minority men.2 72 The sad reality is that many people's conscious
or subconscious picture of a violent criminal is a minority male,
regardless of the nature of the violence. In turn, the very
269. Id. at 1006 (quoting James Ewinger, Woman Gets Prison in Boyfriend's Killing,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 20, 1994, at 3B).
270. Id. at 1006-07.
271. See Michelle S. Jacobs, Piercing the Prison Uniform of Invisibility for Black
Female Inmates, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 795, 806 (2004) (book review) (noting
the possibility that mandatory arrest policies could lead to an "increased number of
women of color being charged with domestic violence, since the police and the courts
do not view black women as victims of domestic violence, but rather as mutual
combatants in assault cases"); Meghan Condon, Note, Bruise of a Different Color: The
Possibilities of Restorative Justice for Minority Victims of Domestic Violence, 17 GEO.
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 487, 492 (2010) ("Minority women are more likely to be
arrested than white women, and when they are arrested, they are charged with more
serious crimes than white women.").
272. A 2001 Milwaukee County, Wisconsin study reported that although blacks
represented only 24% of the population, they constituted 66% of prosecuted domestic-
violence arrests. Sarah M. Buel, The Pedagogy of Domestic Violence Law: Situating
Domestic Violence Work in Law Schools, Adding the Lenses of Race and Class, 11 AM.
U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 309, 319 (2003) (citing studies). By contrast, whites,
who comprised 62% of the population, represented only 32% of prosecuted domestic-
violence arrests. Id.; see also Maguigan, supra note 19, at 439 ("Certainly, African
American men and Latinos are disproportionately represented among domestic
violence defendants in criminal courts . . . .").
273. See Henderson, supra note 149, at 586-87 (discussing depictions of
criminals in popular culture).
2013] 1373
1374 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [50:5
structure of our discretionary criminal system puts minorities in
a position to be disproportionately harmed by tougher criminal
laws... and disproportionately unaided by lenient criminal
policies."
Critics further maintain that by essentializing battered
women as pro-prosecution or scared, domestic violence reform
discounts minority and immigrant women's variegated reasons
for avoiding involvement in the domestic violence criminal
system.' For women whose partners are noncitizens, for
example, the potential repercussions of mandatory prosecution
are quite dire. If the partner is deported due to a conviction for
domestic violence,2 " the woman permanently loses a source of
financial support, and her children lose their father.' As a
rational (not pathological) actor, the woman might decide that
such a turn of events is not the best possible result for her.
Moreover, undocumented immigrant victims are justified in the
fear that involvement with the criminal justice system may lead
274. See Coker, supra note 214, at 1034-35 & n.104 (citing findings that
minorities are disproportionately "the subject of criminal justice intervention in
domestic violence cases"); Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 797-98 ("By
effectuating mandatory policies without changing the systemic biases of the criminal
justice system, the oxymoronic but unsurprising result was that, although domestic
violence reform became a reality because of the desire to protect white women, it
resulted in the widespread incarceration of minority men." (footnote omitted)).
275. See Jean Dubail, Pretrial Program May Favor Whites, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN
SENTINEL, Aug. 16, 1990, at 1A, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1990-08-
16/news/9002090256_1whites-account-white-share-disparity (reporting that "more than
three out of four participants in Florida's 'pretrial intervention' programs-which allow
first-time felony offenders to avoid prison and keep their records clean-are white" which
"is a much larger proportion than the white share of the general criminal population").
While aware of color-based disparities within the justice system, domestic violence
reformers "dismiss the racial critique as providing a 'license' for men of color to abuse."
Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 806; see, e.g., Hanna, supra note 232, at 1881-82
("[I1n our efforts to be racially, culturally, and economically sensitive, we cannot allow
violence to go unchecked under the rationale that state intervention is always racist,
ethnocentric, or classist."); Women and Violence: Hearing Before the S. Committee on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 124-25 (1991).
276. See Coker, supra note 214, at 1048-49 (discussing potential negative effects of
prosecution on immigrant and minority women); Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at
813-14 (describing several reasons why minority and immigrant women might avoid
prosecution).
277. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2006) ("Any alien who at any time after
admission is convicted of a crime of domestic violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of
child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment is deportable.").
278. See Hannah R. Shapiro, Battered Immigrant Women Caught in the Intersection
of U.S. Criminal and Immigration Laws: Consequences and Remedies, 16 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 27, 38 (2002) (asserting that "deporting a batterer places most battered
immigrant women in a dire economic situation" because a battered woman is more likely
to choose abuse over "let[ting] her children go hungry").
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to their own deportation.' Racial scholars further contend that
the prosecutorial model downplays the extent to which minority
women fear and resent the criminal justice system.280 Michelle
Jacobs notes, for example, the criminalization model
underestimates black women's "fear [of] contributing to the
already unbearable level of criminal justice intrusion into the
lives of black men."'
Scholars also argue that the one-dimensional battering
narrative assumed by certain domestic violence reforms harms
women across the racial spectrum. According to critics, the
essentialist characterizations are not only demeaning and
stereotyping,"' but they also marginalize the experiences of many
battered women, regardless of race." As useful as essentialist
images may be to those favoring a procriminalization/separation
agenda or eager for a cathartic expression of anger against
abusers, they are simply inaccurate descriptions of the
experiences and feelings of many real victims." There are a
myriad of reasons why battered women are reluctant to separate
from and prosecute their partners. The prosecutorial model, for
279. See Coker, supra note 214, at 1049 (recounting a story in which a domestic-
violence victim who fought back was arrested, convicted, and faced deportation); Shapiro,
supra note 278, at 37 (noting that because of negative police views of immigrants,
battered immigrant women "are more likely to be arrested when they react violently in a
domestic dispute").
280. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1257-58 (1991)
(noting the "unwillingness among people of color to subject their private lives to the
scrutiny and control of a police force that is frequently hostile"); Jacobs, supra note 271, at
806.
281. See Jacobs, supra note 271, at 806. Another compounding problem is that in
socially degraded areas, people have a tendency to call 911 or the police when seeking
social services or when there is a need to address emergencies and other problems. What
these poor and minority victims want is immediate relief and not necessarily to have the
criminal system take over. Unfortunately calling the police can push them down a path
that includes not only mandatory prosecution of and separation from their partners, but
also their own prosecution for other crimes.
282. See Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REv. 973, 975 (1995) (calling the
characterizations of battered women as defectively dependent a "traumatization model"
that "provide [s] an inaccurate, reductionist, and potentially demeaning representation of
woman battering"); O'Connor, supra note 215, at 960 (observing that the common
characterization of battered women as "weak, passive or even pathological .. . has fueled
a societal disbelief and distrust of the victim").
283. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 195, at 62; O'Connor, supra note 215, at 960
(explaining that many different types of domestic violence victims do not fit the "battered
woman stereotype").
284. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 195, at 62 ("Just as the term 'battered woman' is
static and incomplete, so too is the notion that one paradigmatic 'battered woman'
exists."); see also Randall, supra note 202, at 123 (reviewing the criticism of several
academics of essentialist images).
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example, ignores the economic complexities of many battered
women's lives."' Abuse victims often engage in complicated
calculi, balancing the harm of abuse against the pecuniary
benefits of staying with the partner, taking into the account the
possibility of temporary relief through selective utilization of
criminal and civil processes.286 The calculus may very well dictate
that permanent separation and the partner's incarceration is not
the best outcome." Finally, the popular narrative often overlooks
women's emotional attachment to abusers and desire for an
intact family structure."' The domestic violence movement either
disregards the possibility that women love batterers and value
their existing families or writes off such emotions as symptoms of
battered women's defective psyches.
Indeed, critics emphatically object to mandatory policies that
use the assumption of direct duress or pathological psychology to
ignore battered women's choices."' Some take a hardline liberal,
pro-autonomy stance that battered women's choices should be
285. See Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 755 n.61 (observing that many
women lack the economic independence "that would enable them to leave abusive
settings" (quoting Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "The" Feminist Critique of
Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1156 (1993))).
286. See David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Criminal Prosecution of Wife
Assaulters: Process, Problems and Effects, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT:
CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION 127, 150-51 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993) (citing a study
showing that battered women bargain for their safety); Coker, supra note 214, at 1018
(noting that victims resist prosecution "because they were successful in using the threat of
legal intervention to gain concessions from their abuser"); Linda G. Mills, Intuition and
Insight: A New Job Description for the Battered Woman's Prosecutor and Other More
Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 183, 191 (1997) (asserting that the victim's
"opportunity to make that choice [regarding prosecuting] may be just the power the
battered woman needs to stop the violence in her life").
287. Donna Coker notes the costs to women of a law requiring employer notification
of a defendant's domestic violence conviction:
Professional men are not likely to lose their jobs if their boss is notified of a
misdemeanor conviction, but men working in low skill jobs, where men of color
are disproportionately represented, are likely to be fired. The ordinance takes
money directly from poor women and their children by diminishing their
possibility for receiving child support. The ordinance probably increases women's
danger, as well, since unemployed men may be more likely to engage in repeat
violence.
Coker, supra note 214, at 1016.
288. See Judith G. Greenberg, Domestic Violence and the Danger of Joint Custody
Presumptions, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 403, 415 (2005) (observing that women fail to
prosecute abuse for reasons including "desire to keep the family unit intact, [and] concern
for their children, [and] emotional attachment to the abuser" (quoting Edna Erez,
Domestic Violence and the Criminal Justice System: An Overview, 7 ONLINE J. OF ISSUES
IN NURSING (2002), http://www.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/ANAMarketplace/
ANAPeriodicals/OJIN/Tableofoontents/Volume72002/NolJan2002/DomesticViolenceandC
riminalJustice.html)).
289. See supra notes 237-244 and accompanying text.
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followed no matter what.29 0 However, many other critics are also
liberalism skeptics, intimately aware of how the language of "free
choice" can reinforce structural inequality."' They consequently
reject both the authoritarian displacement of victim autonomy
and the claim that the victim's nonprosecutorial choice justifies
institutional blindness to abuse. Instead, these theorists argue
that the state and society have an obligation to understand why
certain women "choose" to stay with abusers and to attempt to
alleviate the subordinating influences that condition that
choice."'
Certainly, many battered women do fear reprisal for
prosecuting and feel safer when the state can prosecute without
their consent. For many other women, however, the choice not to
prosecute is based on other factors such as economics, children,
fear of the criminal system, and even love."' Moreover, even
when a woman is too scared to prosecute, she is often in the best
position to know how to secure her own safety.294 When a
woman's choice not to prosecute is preceded by a subordinating
factor, such as poverty, immigrant status, or lack of child
support, the solution should not be to force her into a choice that
is potentially more damaging to her than leniency toward the
abuser, but to offer services to alleviate those constraining
conditions."
However, the trajectory of domestic violence reform moved
away from distributive programs and toward penal solutions."'
290. See, e.g., BETH KIYOKO JAMIESON, REAL CHOICES: FEMINISM, FREEDOM, AND THE
LIMITS OF LAw 172 (2001) ("A feminist theory of liberty must not protect the right of the
abuser to harm but must protect the right of the woman to decide for herself whether to
leave."); Goodmark, supra note 19, at 46 ("If empowerment is still the goal of the battered
women's movement, we must accept that women who have been battered have the right to
make choices that we might disagree with, dislike, or fear.").
291. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
292. See Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 752, 824-25 (arguing that domestic
violence reform should "envision( I all parties in the domestic violence system as complex
actors who are capable of making free choices and yet constrained by their social
realities"); Randall, supra note 202, at 142-43 (suggesting that the state shift focus "onto
the barriers which interfere with and/or limit the possibility of a successful prosecution").
293. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
294. See Mordini, supra note 215, at 323 (contending that the woman "is in a better
position to choose, as she knows best what her partner is capable of and what is likely to
occur from the separation").
295. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. Sue Osthoff, the Director of the
National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women (NCDBW), notes, "Twenty-
five years ago, women of color were saying that we should not turn to the criminal legal
system. But we put all our eggs in one basket without seeking other creative ways of
community intervention." Maguigan, supra note 19, at 432-33 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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This trajectory appears to reflect the popular sentiments of a
large segment of American society, which over the past several
decades found welfare policies and even the very concept of the
social safety net more and more intolerable, while increasingly
becoming procrime control and promilitary intervention."' Many
are familiar with the "strange bedfellows" critique of domestic
violence."' But the critical analysis of the criminalization bent of
this feminist reform is much more than "sticking it" to domestic
violence activists by pointing out the hypocrisy of aligning with
conservative, even misogynist, crime control zealots. Rather,
scholars argue that the prosecutorial "solution" to domestic
violence and its concurrent bolstering of the antidistributive
penal state is really at odds with providing distributive justice to
women most in need of help.9
Some respond to the critique of criminalization by
optimistically emphasizing that we can "have it all." The state
can simultaneously pursue criminal policies and seek social
solutions to counter the antecedents of abuse. 0 Critics of the
prosecution model rejoin that understanding the recent history of
the American penal system leads inexorably to the conclusion
that pursuing harsh criminal policies undermines substantive
297. See Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the
Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 803 (2003) (observing that this
shift in mindset occurred amidst "global economic changes" and "white backlash" to
government-supported racial equality); supra note 257 and accompanying text.
298. See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOw THE WAR ON
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 177
(2007) (noting that the role of lawmakers has recently "flipped" regarding the
intrusiveness of crime in the governance of family); Coker, supra note 19, at 803 (noting
that domestic violence criminalization is "particularly attractive" to politicians seeking to
be tough on crime); Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 800 (arguing that the
domestic violence criminalization agenda "allowed the government and powerful society
members to simultaneously undermine general feminist reform while claiming to be pro-
woman because of their support for tough domestic violence criminal laws"); Micchio,
supra note 19, at 238 ("With the death of Nicole Brown, politicians raced to the state
house to invoke domestic violence laws, jumping on the 'zero tolerance' bandwagon.").
299. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 195, at 198 ("If feminists are to engage with the
state, it must be to ensure that the interrelationships among violence and gender, work
and violence, economic resources, homelessness, and the material constraints of gender
are central to both theory and practice in domestic violence legal reform efforts."); Sally F.
Goldfarb, Applying the Discrimination Model to Violence Against Women: Some
Reflections on Theory and Practice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 251, 251-52
(2003) ("Domestic violence occurs on a continuum along with other manifestations of sex
discrimination, including inequality in the workplace, deprivation of reproductive rights,
and inadequate access to welfare, child support, and child care.").
300. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Bailey, Lost in Translation: Domestic Violence, "The
Personal Is Political," and the Criminal Justice System, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1255, 1299-1300 (2010) (asserting that future domestic violence policies should improve
criminal laws and address status-based economic disparities).
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equality."o' The characterization of battered women as innocent
objects of abuse and batterers as internally evil, fully-responsible
agents reflects and reinforces the popular conservative political
rhetoric that uses the concept of individual criminality to bolster
free-market values.0 2 Since the 1980s, drug dealers, murderers
like Willie Horton, and lazy welfare mothers have been the
essential icons representing the failure of social welfare and why
there are no excuses for poor individual choices.03 Emphasizing
that evil individuals cause social problems allows the
government to be seen as a white knight using its prosecutorial
powers to stamp out social blight, while otherwise maintaining
the attributes of small government."
In addition, the substance of criminal law in the United
States has long had an antidistributive bent. It defines
culpability by a small number of the defendant's choices within a
301. See SIMON, supra note 298, at 190-91; Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 1206 (2005) ("Invoking a criminal justice framework leads us
to alter fundamental understandings about the nature and scope of the risk posed by
particular behaviors.").
302. See Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 764-65 (discussing how
conservatives' concept of individual criminality "characterized crime not as a social ill, but
rather as an independent force hostile to American society"); supra note 257 and
accompanying text.
303. See Henderson, supra note 149, at 586-87 (observing that in popular
consciousness, "[diefendants are subhuman; they are monsters"); Jon Hurwitz &
Mark Peffley, Playing the Race Card in the Post-Willie Horton Era: The Impact of
Racialized Code Words on Support for Punitive Crime Policy, 69 PUB. OPINION Q. 99
(2005); Pearson Liddell, Jr., Stevie Watson & William D. Eshee, Jr., Welfare Reform
in Mississippi: TANF Policy and Its Implications, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y &
L. 1107, 1113 (2003) ("The term 'welfare queen' originated from Reagan's inaccurate
portrayal of welfare recipients as lazy African-American women with values and
morals contradicting those of working and middle class Americans."). President
Reagan stated his philosophy as follows:
Individual wrongdoing, they told us, was always caused by a lack of material
goods, and underprivileged background, or poor socioeconomic conditions.
And somehow, and I know you've heard it said-I heard it many times when
I was Governor of California-it was society, not the individual, that was at
fault when an act of violence or a crime was committed. Somehow, it wasn't
the wrongdoer but all of us who were to blame. Is it any wonder, then, that a
new privileged class emerged in America, a class of repeat offenders and
career criminals who thought they had the right to victimize their fellow
citizens with impunity.
Ronald W. Reagan, Remarks at the Annual Conference of the National Sheriffs
Association in Hartford, Connecticut (June 20, 1984), RONALD REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL
LIBRARY, http://www.reagan.utexas.edularchives/speeches/1984/62084c.htm.
304. See Jonathan Simon, From a Tight Place: Crime, Punishment, and
American Liberalism, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 853, 854 (1999) (book review) ("Both
Presidents Reagan and Bush embraced punishment as one of the few forms of
domestic governance defensible within their political ideology." (footnotes
omitted)).
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limited time frame."o' Only once the defendant is convicted and
proceeds to sentencing does the larger social context in which the
defendant's choices occurred have some relevance. Today's
sentencing guidelines, however, regard defendants' backgrounds
as wholly immaterial to the question of punishment.3 16 The
perverse racial result is that while minority status is included in
many people's images of a prototypical criminal and creates the
risk of greater exposure to punishment, minorities' and
immigrants' experiences of subordination cannot be grounds for
relief from criminal sanctions."' This explains in part why
policies that tend to increase police officers' power, strengthen
criminal penalties, or make it easier to achieve conviction
disproportionately affect minorities.0 s
The language of domestic violence reform appeals to
conservatives and a significant segment of the public precisely
because it divorces domestic violence from its sociocultural
predicates. In this way, authoritarian domestic abuse laws
directly undermine feminism's "commitment to a more
egalitarian distributive structure and a greater sense of
collective responsibility.,3 09  Criminalization assumes that
domestic violence is a matter of what a small subset of evil
men do to their female partners and not a matter of women's
structural inequality, certain men's racial and ethnic
subordination, or cultural attitudes about gender roles.1 o
305. Cf. Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal
Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 594 (1981) (contending that the criminal law's "arational
choice between narrow and broad time frames keeps us from having to deal with
more explicit political questions").
306. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (2006) (noting "the general inappropriateness of
considering the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and
responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant"); U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5141.12 (2009) (deeming irrelevant a defendant's "[lack of
guidance as a youth" or "disadvantaged upbringing"); id. § 5H1.10 (prohibiting
consideration of socio-economic background).
307. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10 (stating that
race and national origin "are not relevant in the determination of a sentence"); supra note
149 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 274-275 and accompanying text; see generally L. Song
Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2044-
52 (2011) (discussing the role of unconscious racial bias in policing).
309. Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1184
(1994).
310. Merry, supra note 228, at 359 (contending that criminalization indicates that
domestic violence is "a problem in and of itself and not linked to the larger issues of
women's economic situation, gender socialization, sex segregation, reproduction, and
women's subjugation within the family"); see also Mahoney, supra note 153, at 12 (noting
that the focus on "individual violent actors" conceals "the ways in which state and society
participate in the subordination of women").
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Consequently, while most in society condemn domestic
violence as a hideous crime, many do not believe that
curtailing battering involves sweeping social changes.
Elizabeth Schneider explains:
In the media and in legal and legislative arenas, the
problems that battered women face are viewed in isolation;
they are rarely linked to gender socialization, women's
subservient position within society and the family
structure, sex discrimination in the workplace, economic
discrimination, problems of housing and lack of child care,
lack of access to divorce, inadequate child support,
problems of single motherhood, or lack of educational and
community support.an
Finally, scholars critique the domestic violence reform
movement's treatment of the public-private distinction. As
noted before, one of the first strategic moves in domestic
violence reform was to counter the notion that battering is a
private matter inappropriate for state intervention.3 " Since
then, the state has been more than willing to intervene in
perceived dysfunctional homes.13 Rarely does this intervention
come in the form of elective distributive benefits. Rather, the
preferred form of intervention is criminal in nature."' Even the
noncriminal interventions, such as civil protection orders and
child protective services, involve deprivation, separation, and
monitoring."' Jeannie Suk asserts that the misdemeanor
domestic violence system and its broad deployment of civil
protection orders empowers the government to go beyond
preventing imminent abuse and reorder nearly all aspects of
"disordered" homes."' She notes the system's tendency to alter
the nature of apparently abusive relationships through
rearranging custody, residency, and financial obligations, and
even imposing de facto divorce. Suk concludes by urging
"critical reflection on the increasing subordination of
311. SCHNEIDER, supra note 195, at 72.
312. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
313. See Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a Woman?, 97 GEO. L.J. 485, 504 (2009) (noting the
opposing views of "the home and the woman in it as respectable and thus needing privacy,
or alternatively, as disordered and thus needing police protection from privacy").
314. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 195, at 183 (making the case that "feminist
liberatory discourse challenging patriarchy and female dependency . .. has been replaced
by discourse emphasizing crime control").
315. See id. at 742 n.2 (discussing the civil protection order process).
316. See Suk, supra note 191, at 43-53; Murray, supra note 188, at 1266-68
(asserting that criminal law has always assisted family law in defining family
relationships).
317. Suk, supra note 191, at 47-50, 53, 59.
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individual autonomy in domestic space to state control in the
public interest."'
In the end, domestic violence reform has been a mixed bag of
women's empowerment and disempowerment, political
progressivism and conservatism, and social change and
stagnation. Domestic violence reform has surely profoundly
benefitted many women. Restructured legal mechanisms forced
state actors to take abuse seriously, and society changed its view
of battering from legitimate discipline or a private matter to a
serious crime that monstrous men perpetrate."' Nevertheless,
the intervention proved to be far less radical as a matter of
equalizing gender relationships generally, improving the
battered women's socioeconomic stature, and ameliorating the
subordination of minorities and other groups. Moreover, the anti-
abuse movement has often deployed essentialist images that
assume battered women share the same injurious experiences,
affected psyches, and prosecutorial desires.2 e It has also
supported authoritarian policies that subordinate battered
women's choices to larger goals of criminal retribution and
incapacitation.'
This has engendered a vocal neofeminist critique, lodged by
scholars very aware of how battering reflects and reinforces
gender hierarchy. The critique objects to reductionist
characterizations of abuse survivors and batterers that
disadvantage minorities, divorce domestic violence from social
inequity, and form the groundwork for discounting victims'
choices. It censures domestic violence reform's complicity in
bolstering the American penal state, a racially subordinating
institution that is diametrically opposed to distributive
strategies. Finally, neofeminists critique domestic violence
reform's tendency to undermine family privacy.
VI. CONCLUSION: A NEOFEMINIST MOMENT?
This Part recapitulates the nature of neofeminism, discusses
its temporal fit into the larger feminist movement, and considers
318. Id. at 70.
319. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 195, at 27 ("Some reforms have been
institutionalized, and the problems of battered women have achieved credibility and
visibility."); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 177 (2007) ("The role of crime
in the governance of the family has virtually flipped in the last two generations.").
320. Cf Goodmark, supra note 19, at 44-45 (criticizing dominance feminism's
conception of a single, universal "woman").
321. See Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 20, at 766-68 ("Tough on crime ideology




how recognizing a neofeminist moment might impact the current
political discourse. Neofeminism may be more properly
characterized as an evolution than revolution in feminist theory.
It is a set of ideas that emerged as scholars had the opportunity
to gauge the larger successes and drawbacks of second-wave
feminism's theoretical and legal interventions. Rather than
characterizing women as autonomous liberal agents or perpetual
objects of oppression, neofeminism acknowledges that women
must navigate the complex matrix of social, cultural, and
institutional constraints. Rather than assuming there is but
one monolithic woman's voice, neofeminism recognizes that
women's needs and identities are ever-shifting and racially,
culturally, and economically contextual. 323  Rather than
exclusively relying on prohibitory law as the vehicle of change,
neofeminist theories seek innovative ways to shape a
nonhierarchical society.3 ' Rather than prioritizing women's
needs over the needs of other subordinated groups (including
certain men), neofeminists recognize that women are often the
beneficiaries of breaking down larger structures of
subordination."'
Neofeminism is not a postmodern rejection of feminism's
embrace of gender categories.3" Although critical of many second-
wave feminist truisms, neofeminist scholarship continues to
centralize women's empowerment, as socially constructed,
contextual, and impossible to concretely define as the category
322. See supra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
323. See HOOKS, supra note 2, at 31 ("Feminism as a movement to end sexist
oppression directs our attention to systems of domination and the inter-relatedness of sex,
race, and class oppression."); supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 298-299 and accompanying text.
325. See HOOKS, supra note 2, at 156; supra note 166 and accompanying text.
There is an emergent school of legal feminism, "masculinities studies," which
concentrates specifically on the interplay of constructions of masculinity and
subordination. See Frank Rudy Cooper, "Who's the Man?": Masculinities Studies, Terry
Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 684-85 (2009)
("[Mlasculinities studies describes the ways in which assumptions about the meaning of
manhood are used to justify particular ideas and institutions."); see generally NANCY
DowD, THE MAN QUESTION (2010) (discussing how masculinities scholarship can be
incorporated into feminist theory).
326. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing postmodern breaks from
feminism); cf. James Gathii, Exporting Culture Wars, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
67, 79 n.93 (2006) ("Postmodern feminist discourses are distinguished from other sub-
disciplines of feminism most prominently on their theory that sex is socially
constructed through language and therefore not determinable or natural and that there
is no single cause for women's inequality."); Gowri Ramachandran, Manliness by
Harvey Mansfield, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 201, 216-17 (2007) (book review)
("[P]ostmodern feminists promote the disruption of identity.").
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"woman" may be."' Feminist theorizing has long existed in
ontological self-contradiction. As Catherine MacKinnon states of
dominance feminism, "[fleminism affirms women's point of view
by revealing, criticizing, and explaining its impossibility. This is
not a dialectical paradox. It is a methodological expression of
women's situation.. .. " Deborah Rhode similarly opines that
feminist theory can simultaneously "locate judgment within the
patterns of social practice" and "subject that judgment to
continuing critique.""
"Neofeminism" is somewhat of a misnomer because the ideas
and critiques it encompasses are not really brand new. Many of
the ideas have been germinating since the late 1980s and some
even before.30 For example, the racial critique of liberal
feminism's essentialist assumptions has been around for
decades."' Left feminists have also long been critical of
dominance feminism's down-playing of class and economic
status."' Even the critique of domestic violence criminal reform
has existed for over twenty years, having been formulated in
response to early discourse and efforts.' In fact, neofeminism is
quite similar to what Martha Minow identified in 1989 as "the
third stage of feminism."334
According to Minow, "the first stage articulated women's
claims to be granted the same rights and privileges as men.""
Professor Minow's "first stage" accordingly corresponds to liberal
feminism."' She characterizes the "second stage" of feminism as a
response to liberal feminism's tendency to "neglect[ I] the highly
327. Neofeminism, although it embraces antiessentialism, does not wrestle with
the woman question as deeply or in the same manner as postmodern feminism.
328. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, in FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY 136 (Sandra Harding ed., 1987).
329. Rhode, supra note 113, at 626.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 197 & 211.
331. See, e.g., HOOKS, supra note 2, at 34 ("Narcissistically, [white feminists] focused
solely on the primacy of feminism in their lives, universalizing their own experiences.
Building a mass-based women's movement was never the central issue on their agenda.").
332. See Harris, supra note 59, at 588-89; Frances Olsen, Feminist Theory in Grand
Style, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1170 (1989) (book review) (noting the objection that
MacKinnon's "[girand theory tends to be reductionist" and "may suppress the complexity
and ambiguities of life").
333. See, e.g., Maguigan, supra note 250, at 382-83; Schneider, supra note 248, at
566 ("Early work on battered women perhaps underestimated the difficulty, the obstacles,
the psychological barriers to seeing women as reasonable. The enormous credibility
problems that women face as complainants and witnesses . .. seem almost
insurmountable.").
334. Martha Minow, Introduction: Finding Our Paradoxes, Affirming Our Beyond, 24
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989).
335. Id.
336. See supra Part ILA.
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individual experience and responsibilities that make institutional
and cultural obstacles so difficult to surmount." Second-stage
scholarship accordingly emphasizes "women's historical and
contemporary differences."' Minow's second stage appears to
illustrate the cultural feminist reaction to liberal feminism
during the second wave.' Minow's third and final stage is one in
which feminist scholarship deemphasizes differences between
men and women in favor of a more contextual approach to
antisubordination.o Writers in the third stage recognize that:
the focus on similarities and differences between men and
women risks locking feminist advocacy in a perpetual and
unresolvable battle over whether gender differences or
similarities predominate, rather than drawing attention to
the varieties of individual and subgroup experiences and
sources of personal and social information that can and
must be marshaled if social change can be envisioned and
achieved. 4
Consequently, although Minow's third stage adopts
dominance feminism's position that focusing on sameness or
difference is not the key to understanding women's status,3 42 it
departs from dominance feminism in an important way. Instead
of concentrating on a uniform description of women's
subordination to men, it calls for considering individual and
subgroup experiences to achieve more general social
transformation.
In a similar vein, and as further evidence that this may all
just be old wine in a new bottle, in 1990, Deborah Rhode
authored an essay about a body of scholarship, which she termed
"critical feminism."34' According to Rhode, critical feminism,
while concerned with women's disempowerment, is quite distinct
from liberal, cultural, and dominance feminism. Critical
feminism is skeptical of the atomistic self and the objective
construction of rights and privacy but recognizes that these
liberal constructs can be practically useful.3 45 Critical feminism
acknowledges the strength of cultural feminism's "demand that
337. Minow, supra note 334, at 2.
338. Id.
339. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
340. Minow, supra note 334, at 3-4.
341. Id. at 4.
342. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
343. Minow, supra note 336, at 4.
344. See Rhode, supra note 113, at 625.
345. See id. at 628-32 (noting that critical feminism generally rejects these concepts,
but finds that they have pragmatic value).
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values traditionally associated with women be valued and that
legal strategies focus on altering societal structures, not just
assimilating women within them," but cautions that "to
emphasize only the positive attributes traditionally associated
with women is to risk overclaiming and oversimplifying their
distinctive contributions.""" So like dominance feminism and
Minow's third-stage feminism, critical feminism also seeks to
move past the sameness/difference dichotomy.3 47  Critical
feminism diverges from dominance feminism in its reluctance to
recognize any unified female experience of subordination"
Nevertheless, "[to disclaim objective standards of truth is not to
disclaim all value judgments. We need not become positivists to
believe that some accounts of experience are more consistent,
coherent, inclusive, self-critical, and so forth." Thus, the
lynchpin of critical feminism is combined activism and
skepticism."e It also favors a contextual focus on concrete issues
rather than generating utopian ideals.'
Perhaps neofeminism is simply the continuation of the third
stage of feminism that Minow identified over twenty years ago or
just another name for critical feminism. However, it appears that
neofeminist scholarship involves more than just moving past the
difference dilemma and calling for antiessentialism or skepticism
in feminist legal theory.' In addition to those ideas, neofeminist
writing adopts specific views of the contextual value and harm of
privacy, the subordinating effect of police power, the double-
edged nature of agency, and the role of distributive programs in
social transformation."' Nevertheless, it is evident the story of
feminism is not a temporally linear story of a chronologically
evolving line of analysis in a singular context. Rather, in
feminism, as in many areas of theorizing, different ideas come
and go-they peak and trough over time." Although neofeminist
346. Id. at 624-25.
347. See id. at 630-32 ("Part of the problem with 'difference' as an organizing
principle is that legal decisionmakers do not always seem to know it when they see it.").
348. See id. at 622-23.
349. Id. at 626.
350. See id. at 619.
351. See id. at 637-38.
352. See id. at 626 ("What allies this method with other critical accounts is its
skepticism toward everything, including skepticism. Critical feminist theories retain
a commitment to locate judgment within the patterns of social practice, to subject
that judgment to continuing critique, and to promote gender equality as a normative
ideal.").
353. See id.
354. See HOOKS, supra note 2, at 10 (asserting that in order to resist "hegemonic"
feminism, women must "necessarily criticize, question, re-examine, and explore new
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ideas are not completely novel, it does seem that there is
currently a distinct phenomenon of convergence that constitutes
an important moment in feminist theorizing. Today, scholars are
producing neofeminist scholarship that deviates from the
orthodox second-wave script in a wide variety of areas outside of
domestic violence reform, including family law, international
human rights and criminal law, sexual relations and sex work,
and religious and cultural studies."'
The question then is whether there is a point to acknowledging
this moment in feminist legal thought and naming it."' The existing
labels for feminism are exhaustive and exhausting: first-wave,
second-wave, third-wave, liberal, cultural, dominance, radical,
Marxist, power, postmodern. Nonetheless, I do believe that there is
a point in recognizing that there is a new and powerful left
feminism. To understand the role that neofeminism might play in
today's legal and political dialogue, it is important to appreciate the
current status of the term "feminism" in popular discourse.
In the past, the use of the feminist label always signaled a
commitment to progressive and politically liberal values and
policies. Katharine Bartlett notes that although "[ulse of the label
'feminist' has substantial problems," one benefit has been that
"labeling methods or practices or attitudes as feminist identifies
them as a chosen part of a larger, critical agenda originating in the
experiences of gender subordination."- 57 Similarly, Martha
Chamallas remarks:
Most legal writers or practitioners who identify themselves as
feminists are critical of the status quo. The root of the
criticism is the belief that women are currently in a
subordinate position in society and that the law often reflects
and reinforces this subordination. Whatever their differences,
feminists tend to start with the assumption that the law's
treatment of women has not been fair or equal and that
change is desirable."'
In recent times, however, the feminist label has become broad
or co-opted enough to accommodate distinctly anticritical,
possibilities"); Rhode, supra note 113, at 626 ('[Flactors that divide [feminists] can
also be a basis for enriching our theoretical perspectives and expanding our political
alliances.").
355. See supra note 19 (listing articles).
356. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 835
(1990) (observing that despite the difficulties with the "feminist" label, "[tlo sustain
feminism, feminists must use presently understandable categories, even while
maintaining a critical posture toward their use").
357. Id. at 833-34.
358. CHAMALLAS, supra note 84, at 1 (footnote omitted).
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subordinating attitudes. In a quite oxymoronic development, there
has been a simultaneous glorification of the notion that bra-
burning, "womyn"-empowering feminism is dead.." and
appropriation of the term "feminist" by those who reject all the
progressive aspects of feminism and adopt the most conservative
interpretations of the second-wave orthodoxies.
Today, self-termed feminists include neoconservatives like
Sarah Palin-those who embrace their inherent cultural roles as
mothers, wives, and cookie-bakers, but insist that women should
not receive "special" treatment or, God forbid, government
subsidies. 6 0 They are more than happy to embrace harsh
prosecution of "real" criminals and advocate draconian treatment
of "predators" who victimize children and women.36 1 The
"ifeminists.com" website, for example, touts "individualist
feminism" as truly reflecting the "original" ideas of feminism.362 It
holds, among other things, that women should homeschool their
children to undermine public education and fight "the forces of
feminism who say a woman's place is in the paying workplace,"
that college women's studies programs be defunded, 4 and that
"[a]s long as women are as free as men to run for office and to
vote as they choose, then whatever number of women are elected
is the right number for an equality based on freedom."' It is true
that these extremely conservative voices probably do not
represent most people's idea of feminism. Nonetheless, those who
359. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
360. During her campaign, Palin stated, "I'm a feminist who believes in equal rights
and I believe that women certainly today have every opportunity that a man has to
succeed and to try to do it all anyway." Transcript: Palin and McCain Interview (Feb. 11,
2009, 2:15 PM), CBSNEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/09/30/eveningnews/
main4490788.shtml>source=m; see also Adrienne D. Davis, Introduction to Symposium,
The Politics of Identity after Identity Politics, 33 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 1 (2010)
("Republicans embraced feminist rhetoric in unprecedented numbers to defend Sarah
Palin's gender performance, reproductive choices, and work/family balance."); Robin
Abcarian, Insiders See "New Feminism," L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2008, at A13 (quoting Laura
Ingraham as stating that "Sarah Palin represents a new feminism").
361. See supra notes 296-299 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note
265.
362. See Individualist Feminism FAQs, IFEMINISTS.COM, http//www.ifeminists.com/
el07-plugins/content/content.php?cat.9 (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
363. See Can a Feminist Homeschool Her Child?, IFEMINISTS.COM,
http://www.ifeminists.com/e107_plugins/contentlcontent.php?content.605 (last visited
Apr. 5, 2013).
364. See What Is the Ifeminist Position on Having Women's Studies Programs at
Public Universities?, IFEMINISTS.COM, http//ifeminists.com/e107 plugins/content/content.
php?content.30 (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
365, See Equal Access Does Not Guarantee Equal Outcome, WENDYMcELRoY.coM




claim they are for women's empowerment today are seldom
socialists or leftists. They are prosecutors advocating for more
criminal law,"' business women seeking better ways to climb the
corporate ladder,367 and "stay-at-home-moms" wholly devoted to
parenting."'
A strong neofeminist voice could counter both the belief that
feminism is dead.6 and the conservative co-optation of the term
feminism by demonstrating that progressive feminism is alive
and kicking. Publicizing the abundance of neofeminist writing
can in a sense "take back" the feminist label and send the
message that feminism is an active, generative, and vibrant
progressive movement. To those who are discouraged that
political thinking has become one big tea party, neofeminism can
affirm that feminism is really about rejecting stereotypical
thinking, fighting subordination in all its forms, and supporting a
just, distributive state.
In addition, recognizing a neofeminist moment can serve to
temper the feeling of "paralysis produced by the many internal
critiques of feminism."' 0 One feminist scholar warns that
"feminist theory is on the brink of self-annihilation."m' She
observes, "After waves of liberal, radical, and cultural feminism,
we are now riding a 'third wave' of feminism that risks crashing
into nothingness. The permutations of feminist legal theory have
366. See Gruber, Rape, Feminism, supra note 20, at 583 ("The zealous, well-groomed
female prosecutor who throws the book at 'sicko' sex offenders has replaced the 1970s bra-
burner as the icon of women's empowerment."); cf Rose Corrigan, Making Meaning of
Megan's Law, 31 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 267, 276 (2006) (observing the "political capital of
feminist rape law reform," which includes 'getting tough' on sex offenders, attention to
child sexual abuse, land] concern for victims").
367. See Georgie Anne Geyer, Feminism Dead, or Just More Practical?, THE PATRIOT-
NEws, Dec. 8, 1989, at A15 ("[C]lassic feminism died in the lemminglike rush of many
women to law school (the fastest way up), to the corporate ladder (direct express to
success), and to the 'balancing' of career and marriage (having it all).").
368. Being a pregnant person and a first time parent of a newborn while writing this
Article, I can attest to the innumerable pregnancy, baby, and mommy blogs that
constantly remind those gestating and parenting about the dire risks of normal behavior
(eating occasional sushi) and the necessity of constant attention to the child (tummy time,
developmental milestones, reading to a newborn, milk supply, baby-wearing, omega three
supplements, and the list goes on). Cyberspace is filled with aggressive defenses of
domesticity. See Linda R. Hirshman, Everybody Hates Linda, WASH. POST, June 18, 2006,
at B1 (noting, for example, that one commenter stated, "I feel even more sure about my
choice to stay at home and raise my children after hearing what an elitist like Ms.
Hirshman thinks! ... rm sad for her-she has such a limited view of womanhood.").
369. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
370. Brenda Cossman, Sexuality, Queer Theory, and "Feminism After": Reading and
Rereading the Sexual Subject, 49 McGILL L.J. 847, 854 (2004).
371. Hill, supra note 78, at 135.
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proliferated to the point of endangering feminism's existence."72
Although neofeminism certainly is not a unified grand theory of
women's condition and neofeminists do not speak with one voice,
it is meaningful that there are so many scholars committed to
analyzing "the woman question," despite devastating postmodern
critiques, using similar methodologies that break from second-
wave orthodoxies.
We should not think of these neofeminist voices as fractured,
unrelated assessments of second-wave feminism, but as a new
way of doing feminism. As Nancy Fraser remarks:
[T]his is a moment in which feminists should think big.
Having watched the neoliberal onslaught instrumentalize
our best ideas, we have an opening now in which to reclaim
them. In seizing this moment, we might just bend the arc of
the impending transformation in the direction of
justice-and not only with respect to gender."'3
Neofeminists are thinking big. They are breaking from
dogmatic, authoritarian, and right-leaning feminist
methodologies, yet staying true to the original program of
women's empowerment. They are forging ahead with bold
progressive ideas that challenge popular cultural attitudes, the
current economic paradigm, and even the very structure of
society. This feminism is anything but dead.
372. Id. (footnote omitted). Hill further criticizes that "'[alnti-essentialist reader[s],'
half-finished manifestos, 'multiplicative' identity analyses, intersectionality, erotica
theory, even the hint of a return to liberalism-all are welcomed." Id. (second alteration in
original) (footnotes omitted).
373. Nancy Fraser, Feminism, Capitalism, and the Cunning of History, 56 NEW LEFr
REV. 97, 117 (2009).
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